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ABSTRACT 
 This study explores the role of Finnish Special Operations Forces (FINSOF) in 
the northern Europe’s changing security environment by examining ways that FINSOF 
can become flexible enough to face rising hybrid threats from Russia. In order to become 
Finland’s strategic-level first response force against hybrid threats, both at home and 
abroad, FINSOF will require some integration and reshaping of its structures and tasks. 
Using three scenarios situated in the Baltic Sea area, this study analyzes FINSOF 
according to its Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats in order to develop 
the force into a more efficient tool of the Finnish government. In order to develop new 
structures and tasks, FINSOF requires a SOF-specific doctrine with a vision and clear 
goals, which would lay out a path for FINSOF to follow as it evolves. FINSOF’s ability 
to counter hybrid threats in the future will require flexibility, utilizing tailored forces and 
scalable command structures. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The warrior knows that he is free to choose his desires, and he makes 
these decisions with courage, detachment and—sometimes—with just a 
touch of madness. 
—Paulo Coelho1 
 
The security environment in the northern part of Europe, especially near the Baltic 
Sea and neighboring areas, has moved in a less secure direction. In particular, Russia has 
announced that it considers the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a security 
threat. It has increased its military power near its western borders in response to NATO 
movements and troops in the Baltic area. Several times during the last decade, Moscow has 
used harder rhetoric against Western countries, especially after political discussions in 
Finland about NATO membership. Russia would not like it if Finland decides to submit its 
NATO membership application. In 2016, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
said that Russia “will take all necessary military-technical measures at our Northern 
borders.”2 In another 2017 media event, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated: “If 
Sweden joins NATO this will negatively affect our relations because we will consider that 
the infrastructure of the military bloc now approaches us from the Swedish side. We will 
interpret that as an additional threat for Russia, and we will think about how to eliminate 
this threat.”3 From Finland’s point of view, threats like these need to be taken seriously, 
and, if necessary, readiness structures, organizations, and procedures should be renewed.  
NATO has mentioned Russia as a key factor affecting the security situation in the 
northern part of Europe. In a 2017 RAND report, The Russian Way of Warfare, Scott 
                                                 
1 Paulo Coelho, “The Heart of the Warrior,” last modified August 31, 2016, 
http://paulocoelhoblog.com/2016/08/31/the-heart-of-the-warrior. 
2 Matti Huuhtanen, “Finnish Report Highlights Russian Threat of NATO Membership,” The Seattle 
Times, April 29, 2016, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/finnish-report-highlights-russian-threat-
of-nato-membership. 
3 Damien Sharkov, “Russia Will Take Military Action and ‘Eliminate’ the Threat if Sweden Joins 




Boston and Dara Massicot state that Russia does not have one standard way to operate; 
instead, it tailors its operations to different environments and strategic requirements. This 
ability allows Russia to be capricious and very unpredictable, and leads Finland to a 
fundamental principle:  prepare for war.4 Non-predictable behavior in Finland’s neighbor 
country requires a flexible response force. In Finland, there is such a structure, the Finnish 
Special Operations Forces (FINSOF), but is FINSOF flexible enough to respond to the 
Russian threat? Specifically, how can FINSOF become flexible enough to cope with both 
internal and external missions in the face of rising hybrid threats from Russia, and what is 
Finnish Special Operations’ role in this new security situation?  
In terms of Flexibility, the Finnish Defence Forces SOF and Ministry of Interior 
SOF need more integration, interoperability,5 and capabilities to carry out both internal and 
external missions in the different kinds of security situations they may encounter. Some 
integration and reshaping of the structures and tasks of FINSOF will be necessary so that 
it can function as Finland’s strategic-level first-response force against hybrid threats.6 This 
study makes a number of recommendations for ways to accomplish this.  
A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This capstone project focuses on Finland’s special operations in different scenarios 
related to the security situation in Northern Europe. Specifically, it aims to investigate what 
                                                 
4 Scott Boston et al., The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE231.html. 
5 According to NATO, interoperability means: “The ability for Allies to act together coherently, 
effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Specifically, it enables 
forces, units and/or systems to operate together and allows them to share common doctrine and procedures, 
each others’ infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate. Interoperability reduces duplication, 
enables pooling of resources, and produces synergies.” “Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces,” 
NATO, accessed August 28, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_84112.htm. 
6  According to CoE, a hybrid threat is: “1) Coordinated and synchronized action, that deliberately 
targets democratic states’ and institutions systemic vulnerabilities, through a wide range of means, 2) 
activities exploit the threshold of detection and attribution as well as the border between war and peace, and 
3) aim is to influence different forms of decision making at the local, state, or institutional level to favor 
and/or gain the agent’s strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting the target.” “Countering Hybrid 




kinds of changes will be needed, if any, to confront the challenges that FINSOF and Finnish 
special operations will face in the future. As Marcus Aurelius wrote 2000 years ago, “Don’t 
fear the future. You will face it, if that is your fate, armed with the same reason that protects 
and guides you in the present.”7 
The project aims to shape Finnish special operations so that they will be efficient 
and capable in the 21st century. Time-competitive warfare in the future will require rapid 
decision making. The National Command Authority’s ability to deliver strategic options 
will be judged, and the effective options will be separated from others as Robert Leonhard 
mentioned in his book, The Principles of War for the Information Age.8 Likewise, other 
Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway have changed their Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) structures and tasks recently to sharpen their abilities to respond to new rising 
threats against their nations’ sovereignty. Should Finland do the same? 
SOF have implemented changes into today’s complex battlefield, based on lessons 
learned from fights, and command effectiveness. Special operations, the security 
environment, and the way that wars are conducted have changed, especially since 
September 11, 2001, and those changes continue. Conflicts are becoming local and 
complex, and need the right type of forces and capabilities to solve them. As a result of 
these overall changes in the battlefield, technological development, and Finland’s security 
environment, Finland must have the flexibility to change the Defence Forces’ structure and 
even its doctrine.9 Compounding these changes is the new threat posed by Russia’s 
unpredictable and somewhat aggressive behavior. 
The overall modernization of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) is an ongoing 
process in Finland; as part of that process, FINSOF need to take lessons learned and 
                                                 
7 Marcus Aurelius, The Emperor’s Handbook, trans. C. Scot Hicks and David V. Hicks (New York: 
Scribner, 2002), 78. 
8 Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1998), 251. 
9 Paul R. Norwood, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes, “Capturing the Character of Future War,” 




implications from the current situation and develop their capability and tasks as part of 
Finland’s security structure. Moreover, FINSOF lack doctrine, which is a situation that 
must be remedied soon. In 2016, recognizing the need for change, the Finnish Prime 
Minister’s office released a new paper called Government’s Foreign and Security Policy 
Report (Valtioneuvoston Ulko- ja Turvallisuuspoliittinen Selonteko) that gives the 
guidelines to Finland’s defence policy.10 The FDF follow the defence guidelines from this 
paper and have already started a program focused on development, structure, and primary 
military acquisitions. Also, the Finnish Parliament began to prepare several laws that have 
influenced the Finnish Defence Forces’ tasks. The main arguments in the Government’s 
Foreign and Security Policy Report also offer basic guidelines, which point out where 
Finnish special operations should develop during the next decade. The government report 
argues that all defense security functions have to ensure the fulfillment of key 
responsibilities in all situations and, as resources permit, to support other authorities in 
their duties. The message is still clear that we have to be prepared for the worst-case 
scenario, continue on the path of deterring all possible attackers, and, overall, make Finland 
itself ready. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
This project examines Finnish special operations through three main scenarios 
reflecting Finland’s security environment issues that focus on the northern part of the 
Europe. All of the scenarios are based on Russia’s aggression in the Baltic Sea area, and 
these cases have been published in Suomen Kuvalehti issue 9/2015 as: 1) Finland acting on 
its own: the Åland case; 2) Finland acting bilaterally with Sweden: the Gotland case, and 
3) Finland acting multilaterally: the Narva case. Each of these cases concentrates primarily 
on the question whether Finland can face the worst-case scenario on its own, and whether 
any other countries would help Finland to survive in a crisis. Furthermore, these scenarios 
                                                 
10 The Council of State, Valtioneuvoston Ulko-Ja Turvallisuuspoliittinen Selonteko (Helsinki: Prime 





bring into focus the implications for FINSOF because each scenario follows Russia’s new 
military doctrine and Russian model of conflict known as Gerasimov model.11 
Development of troops, techniques, and tactics has raised Russia’s military to a new level 
with professionalized units. In these circumstances, a small country such as Finland is ill-
suited for positional warfare without the ability to make changes.12 
Figure 1 shows the outline of the overall study. The main purpose of this capstone 
project is to identify FINSOF responsibilities within the studied scenarios, which will be 
done using SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) to categorize 
the different findings.13 The final outcome from the SWOT consists of lists of Advantages, 
Competencies, Strategies, and Risks, which will help to create a mission and vision for 
FINSOF.   
 
Figure 1.  High-level outline of this capstone project.  
Finnish special operations are the primary focus of this study. A comparison of 
special operations capabilities and possibilities in each scenario establishes basic principles 
                                                 
11 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” last modified July 6, 
2018, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-
linear-war. Galeotti clarifies hybrid warfare: “Call it non-linear war (which I prefer), or hybrid war, 
or special war; Russia’s operations first in Crimea and then eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that 
Moscow is increasingly focusing on new forms of politically-focused operations in the future.” 
12 Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Boulder, CO: Eastview Press, 1992), 254. 
13 G. Houben, K. Lenie, and K. Vanhoof, “A Knowledge-Based SWOT-Analysis System as an 
Instrument for Strategic Planning in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises,” Decision Support Systems 26, 
no. 2 (August 1999): 125–135, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9236(99)00024-X. 
 6 
for how to use FINSOF, and enables this study to create a recommendation for enhancing 
the special operations capability. Although all three scenarios have similar starting points, 
the threats and assessments specific to each of them can be very different; this would lead 
to differences in the SOF missions for each scenario due to the differences in capabilities 
required by each one. Table 1 shows the scenarios and some details about their purposes 
and implications. 
Table 1.   Scenario building. 
Scenario Type of Case Study Purpose Implications 
Finland alone; Strategic 
meaning of the Finnish 
Island called Åland. 
Political pressure and 
direct military threat 
Show Russia strategy 
through Gerasimov 
model 
Show how to use 
FINSOF in every case 
Find the answers to 




analysis in different 
scenarios, Effectiveness- 
Efficiency and total 
Viability 
FINSOF at home / 
FINSOF abroad 
Finland bilateral; 
Strategic meaning of the 
Swedish Island called 
Gotland. 
Start of the conflict 
actions and crisis 
Finland multilateral; 
Crisis between Russia 
and NATO, actions 
happened near Finnish 
borders 
Conduct of military 
operations and crisis 
 
C. MODIFICATIONS TO THE NATO SPECTRUM-OF-CONFLICT MODEL 
In Finland has a crisis development model similar to the one used byNATO, based 
on its doctrines and defined as the Spectrum of Conflict.14 Because the NATO model does 
not cover details from the development of the crisis, I have modified it by adding the Pre-
                                                 
14 See Figure 2, according to NATO, phases are: Peacetime, Crisis, Major combat operations, 
Stabilization and Peacetime. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5, Edition A 
(NATO Standardization Agency NSA, 2013), 1–3, http://nso.nato.int/nso/zPublic/ap/AJP-
3.5%20EDA%20V1%20E.pdf. In the Finnish model the violence equilibrium uses the same form and it 
starts from Normal time (Normaaliolot), and the Crisis time is called emergency conditions (Poikkeuolot). 
The Finnish Defence Command, Kenttäohjesääntö, Yleinen, KOYL, official use version (Helsinki: The 
Finnish Defence Forces, 2014), Figure 11, 31.  
 
 7 
Crisis and After Crisis times. Three other phases are Escalation, Crisis/War Time, and 
Stabilization. The violence equilibrium is the same as in NATO’s model, which is at its 
highest during the Crisis/War Time. Because FINSOF can act both abroad and at home, I 
placed the main task categories – Military Assistance (MA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), 
Direct Action (DA) – over all phases (see Appendix A for NATO SOF tasks).15 Only the 
priorities are different in each category; for example, in wartime FINSOF can do the full 
spectrum of special operations, but during the Pre-Crisis time, their focus is more on MA 
tasks. Using FINSOF, this spectrum is based on a combination of operations external (light 
blue color) and internal, across the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Basic layer to scenario build-up process based on the NATO 
Spectrum of Conflict model.16  
Furthermore, there is a so-called gray zone between the Pre-Crisis time and 
Crisis/War times. This period causes uncertainty for political leaders and decision making 
                                                 
15 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 2–1 – 2–7. 
16 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–3. 
 
 8 
structures, creating several vulnerabilities that the enemy can exploit in its operations. 
Because the gray zone line is not clear, we can say that this zone lies somewhere between 
peace and the enemy’s clear attack that leads to a formal state of war.17 Dr. John Arguilla 
has said that the gray zone time, “confuses rather than clarifies the spectrum of conflict.”18  
In Finland, gray zone refers to the time before the nation has not implemented all the 
Crisis/War-time laws.  
The gray zone means uncertainty, misunderstanding, and confusion, which can lead 
the hybrid-threat actors to exploit this situation.19 That is why I placed breakpoints on the 
picture in Figure 2 (indicated by the stars): the supposition is that some part of the FINSOF 
is abroad to do operations when the escalation of a crisis hits Finland. Because Finland 
does not have many specialized trained operators, the assumption is that the Finnish 
Governent will need these men to be in Finland during the Crisis/War Time. This model 
raises the question of whether FINSOF’s basic tasks are in the right place and allow the 
right response to the threats received. The results of the scenarios developed in this 
capstone project demonstrate that changes are required. 
D. DEFINITIONS 
This study uses the following definitions. 
Special Operations: There is no clear definition of special operations in any Finnish 
field manuals. This is because special operations are considered part of the armed services 
and the joint effects, rather than as an independent operation. Therefore, I drew upon the 
                                                 
17 Phillip Lohaus, “Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational Framework for using 
Special Operations Forces in the Space between War and Peace,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 2 
(December 15, 2016): 75–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2016.1239989. 
18 Arguilla wrote also:”[T]oday’s aggressors are most willing to accept insurgency, terror, subversion 
and covert action as war – right alongside increasingly rare occurrences of conventional conflict.” John 
Arguilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained,” Prism 2, no. 3 (May 9, 2018): 
126. https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1507653/perils-of-the-gray-zone-paradigms-lost-paradoxes-
regained/.  
19 Aapo Cederberg et al., Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts (Helsinki: 




definition for Special Operations from the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special 
Operations, AJP-3.5 and from U.S. Doctrine for the Special Operations, JP 3–05 in order 
to create a new definition for Finnish special operations. My definition for Finnish special 
operations is as follows: The Finnish Special Operations are strategic, operational, and 
tactical level effect-based combined Joint operations conducted by the specially selected, 
trained, organized, and equipped forces from the Ministry of Interior and the Finnish 
Defence Forces to achieve the desired end state using special techniques and procedures.20 
(See Appendix B for the NATO and U.S. definitions).   
Likewise, my definition for Finnish Special Operations Forces (FINSOF) also 
draws upon AJP-3.5 and JP 3-05. My definition for FINSOF is this: The Finnish Special 
Operations Forces are active and reserve troops of the Services and from the Ministry of 
Interior, designated and specifically selected, equipped, trained, and organized to conduct 
special operations.21 
Finnish Special Forces (FINSF) must be defined differently from in the United 
States because of their structure and number. Finnish Special Forces are professionals 
specifically selected, equipped, and trained to conduct special tasks in the homeland and 
abroad as part of the larger operations or special operations. Special Forces can operate 
in smaller teams as well as larger formations with highly professional capability, 
designated to act against strategically or operationally meaningful targets.  
In Finland, all Special Forces are Special Operations Forces that are supported by 
other specialized capabilities. Figure 3 contains a schematic representation of the ways that 
those forces and operations are connected. It should be noted that forces from Finland’s 
Ministry of Interior, including the Finnish Police and the Finnish Border Guard SOF units, 
are part of the FINSOF. 
                                                 
20 See NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–1, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine 
for the Special Operations, JP 3–05 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), ix, 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05.pdf. 
21 See NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–1, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special 
Operations 3–05, ix. 
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Figure 3.  Finland Special Operations and Finnish Special Operations Forces, 
developed by author. 
Hybrid Warfare: Because the scenarios presented in Chapter IV use a certain model 
of hybrid warfare, it is important to define it here. Although NATO and the West have 
referred to Russia’s warfare in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine as hybrid warfare, there 
are several different definitions for this term. The following definition, which is a 
combination of those used by Hanna Smith of the European Centre of Excellence for 
Countering Hybrid Threats22 and by Frank Brundtland-Steder in his 2016 article “The 
Theory, History, and Current State of Hybrid Warfare,”23 and it is as follows: Hybrid 
Warfare is a way of conducting operations to achieve strategic goals before a declaration 
of war by using a combination of military and nonmilitary means. Hybrid warfare includes 
hybrid threat characteristics blended with old and new elements of tactics and strategy, 
which are used together during gray zone time.   
E. TRANSLATIONS 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Finnish are by the author.  
                                                 
22 Hanna Smith, In the Era of Hybrid Threats: Power of the Powerful or Power of the “Weak? 
(Helsinki: Hybrid CoE, 2017), 2, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Strategic-
Analysis-October-2017.pdf 
23 Frank B. Steder, “The Theory, History, and Current State of Hybrid Warfare,” Combating Terrorism 
Exchange 6, no. 4 (November, 2016): 7–19, https://globalecco.org/ctx-vol.-6-no.-4-november-2016. 
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II. FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
“We had the experience but missed the meaning.” 
—T. S. Eliot24   
 
This chapter gives an overview of FINSOF’s history, doctrine, tasks, structures, 
and current limitations.      
A. A BRIEF HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION TO FINNISH SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES 
The Finnish military has a long tradition of conducting actions behind enemy lines. 
In Finnish, these traditions are called sissitoiminta (guerrilla-type activity), kaukopartio 
(long-range patrolling), and sissi, a soldier who operates behind enemy lines.25 According 
to Marko Palokangas, soldiers (sissi) who engaged in long-range patrolling were Guerilla 
Jaegers.26 These translations are not entirely precise because guerilla has a different 
meaning in English than in Finnish. In Finland, a guerilla belongs to the regular military 
force, which makes him a so-called legalized soldier.27 The first guidance for actions 
against enemy supply lines and sabotage behind enemy lines was found in Finnish military 
field manuals in 1918 and 1931.28  
An understanding of the principles of management and leadership is important in 
the Finnish Army. Finnish officers brought the principles of Aufragstaktik and Innere 
                                                 
24 T.S. Eliot, AZQuotes, Wind and Fly LTD, accessed October 18, 2018, 
https://www.azquotes.com/quote/561420. 
25 Palokangas highlights that “in modern Finnish, sissi refers to a soldier who belongs to regular army 
and operates in the enemy’s rear, bearing legal insignia.”  Marko Palokangas, Exploding Wilderness: 
Guerrilla-Type Activities in the Finnish Art of War, Finnish Defence Studies 20 (Helsinki: National 
Defence University, 2015): 6–8, http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2808-0. 
26 Marko Palokangas. “Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa” (Doctoral diss., 
National Defence University, Helsinki, 2014), 45, http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2548-5. 
27 Convention of the Hague 1907, IV General Agreement, 1st Annex. Article 1, Geneva, SopS 
11/1924, https://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsviite/1924/19240011.   
28 Paul von, Gerich, Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö, Turku 1918(b), and K.V.Grunn, Kenttäpalveluksen 
opas kuvin ja sanoin I, Otava 1931. 
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Fuhrung from Germany at the end of World War I. Martin van Creveld has described 
Innere Fuhrung like this: “To generate independence, freedom had to be granted. To train 
men toward responsibility, the authority had to be delegated. To create trust, reliability and 
long standing acquaintanceships had to be assured.”29 The fundamental principle assigns 
each soldier the responsibility to do his or her job as well as he or she can do it. This 
principle also means trust between officers and basic fighters. According to the principle 
of Aufragstaktik, like mission-oriented tactics, processes should be as simple as possible, 
and decisions should be made as quickly as possible after a commander’s intention is 
known in every situation.30  
Finnish warfare and tactics developed a lot during World War II. We can say that 
FINSOF also took a long step forward during that time. They were able to use modern 
technology, aircraft, telecommunications, deception, and different vehicles during 
operations. Time and speed became the main elements of their warfare, and those elements 
needed coordination in third generation warfare. (See Appendix C for the historical 
timeline of FINSOF.) 31 
1. Finnish Army Special Operations Forces  
The traditions of today’s Finnish Army Special Forces originate from the period of 
World War II, where the main adversary was the Soviet Union. During the Winter War of 
1939–40 against the Soviet Union, the Finnish high command noticed a lack of intelligence 
concerning enemy formations in the deep area behind enemy lines.32 Consequently, the 
Finnish military leaders wanted to establish four long-range intelligence companies to 
                                                 
29 Martin van, Creveld, Fighting Power, German and U.S.Army Performance 1939–1945 (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 165. See also Jukka Mälkki, “Tehtävätaktiikan olemus, Tehtävätaktiikan 
muodostuminen preussilais-saksalaisessa sotataidossa 1806–1945” (master’s thesis, Finnish Defence 
University, 2009), 116–117, http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe201112316176. 
30 Mälkki, Tehtävätaktiikan olemus, Tehtävätaktiikan muodostuminen preussilais-saksalaisessa 
sotataidossa 1806–1945 (2009), 116–117. 
31 Dennis Gyllensporre, “Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations 
Theory,” in Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges, ed. Gunilla 
Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson (Switzerland, Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 25. 
32 Palokangas,  “Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa,”  129. 
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collect information deep behind enemy lines. In addition, the high command wanted to 
attack enemy targets and supply lines.33 In 1942, four units were organized as one battalion 
(Separate Battalion 4—Er.P 4) under General Headquarters, and it carried out more than 
250 operations behind enemy lines. Some of these tasks were very brief operations of only 
a few days, while the longest patrol took over 50 days, during which the men walked more 
than 500 kilometers.34 These long-range patrol units during the World War II laid the 
groundwork for the development of the Finnish Special Operations Forces (FINSOF). 
Ralf Lillbacka, who has studied Finnish tactics and techniques from World War II, 
highlighted several findings of tactics used in the deep area behind enemy lines. Basic 
tactics were based on patrols, usually at the squad or platoon level, supported by occasional 
air drops. In the winter, patrols were conducted on skis, and in the summer, on foot, 
sometimes supported by seaplanes that would land on the numerous lakes. Large 
woodlands on Finnish borders created the possibility to secretly infiltrate behind enemy 
lines. Tactics remained the same during World War II; the Soviets even developed counter-
tactics and counter-sissi units.35  
Separate Battalion 4 had its main working tools, the rangers, but it also included a 
signal company and an organic flight department, Department Jauri.36 During World War 
II, Finnish Special Operations Forces had three main tasks: SOF air tasks, long-range 
patrolling, and guerilla-type actions.  
                                                 
33 Palokangas,  “Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa,” 61. Palokangas 
highlights that violence, combat, patrol, and long-range reconnaissance were closely related between 1939 
and 1944. 
34 Lassi Saressalo, Päämajan Kaukopartiot Jatkosodassa, 2nd ed. (Juva: WSOY, 1987), 302–303. 
35 Ralf Lillbacka, “Parameters of Simplicity as a Principle of Special Operations,” Special Operations 
Journal 3 (November 14, 2017): 94–110, https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2017.1383811. 




After World War II, Separate Battalion 4 was terminated and almost all specially 
trained soldiers left the Finnish military.37 Their departure was due, at least in part, to a 
common fear that the Soviet Union would charge all specially trained servicemen as war 
criminals or spies for their actions behind Soviet lines, and some of these men had 
participated in Operation Stella Polaris, which was a recovery operation to get all sensitive 
intelligence material to Sweden.38 Subsequently, some specially trained individuals were 
recruited into units in other countries, especially the U.S. Military.39 Nevertheless, some 
of the men who had received training in specialized skills and guerilla-type activities 
remained in the Finnish Army. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Finnish Defence Forces reformed the national 
defence system according to the so-called “Territorial defence”40 concept, which again 
involved guerilla-type activities. General Veikko Koppinen wrote two new field manuals 
1956 and 1957, which provided instructions in guerilla-type fighting behind enemy lines 
as well as in the homeland if the troops were surrounded there.41 The main idea was that 
Finland could exploit paratroopers as part of guerrilla-type missions behind enemy lines.42 
In 1962, the Finnish Defence Forces created the Parachute School at the Utti garrison, with 
the main task of preparing conscripts and commissioned soldiers to do long-range 
patrolling behind enemy lines.43 The Utti garrison was a natural choice because Finnish 
                                                 
37 For example, Bosiljevac describes the U.S. Navy UDT (Underwater Demolition Team) 
decommissioned process in his book. T.L.Bosiljevac, SEALS, UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam (New 
York: Ivy Books, 1990), 5. 
38 Vesa Tynkkynen, Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen, Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet 
Suomessa, 2.edition (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2014), 299, http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-
25-2547-8. 
39 Colonel Alpo Marttinen knew the value of the experiences of these men. Some of these former 
Rangers wrote training memos to the U.S. Army. Alpo Marttinen, Long Distance Patrolling Under 
Subarctic Conditions: Experiences in Russo-Finnish War 1939–1944 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 
Heritage & Education Center, 1950). 
40 Vesa Tynkkynen, Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen, Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet 
Suomessa, 251–253. 
41 Palokangas, “Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa ,” 260. 
42 Hannu Ahokanto, Laskuvarjo Ja Sotilas. Punabaretit - Laskuvarjojääkärikoulu 1962–1996, 2nd ed. 
(Hämeenlinna: Laskuvarjöjääkärien tuki ja perinne ry., 2004), 12–13. 
43 Palokangas “Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa,” 278. 
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Air Force transport planes were already there, and because it had been the site of several 
parachute courses during World War II.  
  The long-range units trained in Utti garrison were quite similar to those from 
World War II, but the size of the unit was quite big: each unit consisted of about 250 men, 
almost all of whom were reservists.44 Each company had four jaeger platoons, with four 
teams and support, a communication platoon and command and control platoons. All 
members of these units were volunteers. Before they were accepted for training, they were 
required to pass tests, and only the best ones were chosen. Passing the tests, however, did 
not guarantee that the recruits would be able to get through the training course, which lasted 
a year and included infantry and guerilla-type tactics, as well as basic skills in gathering 
intelligence.45  Conscripts were taught to use specialized skills and specific tactics with 
speed and surprise to achieve superiority in fighting situations.46 Their tactics and 
equipment were developed for long-range patrolling, and thus were different from those 
used by the regular army.47  
 After the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Finnish Defence Forces were 
restructured. Changes also came to the Parachute School, as the Defence Command 
decided to create a Special Forces training center at Utti. On January 1, 1997 the Parachute 
School, Helicopter Wing, Military Police School, and Support company were combined 
into a new organization, and so the Utti Jaeger Regiment (UTJR), home of the Finnish 
Army Special Forces, was born. At the same time, all Finnish military helicopters were 
assigned under the army echelon, and all fixed-wing airplanes moved elsewhere from Utti. 
                                                 
44 Palokangas wrote: according to Ahokanto, “The training of Finnish paratroopers included guerilla-
type activities from the very beginning; unlike foreign examples, the Finnish paratrooper was not a soldier 
of airborne troops but a patrolman with special training in long-range reconnaissance and guerilla-type 
activities.” Palokangas, Exploding Wilderness: Guerrilla-Type Activities in the Finnish Art of War, 158. 
45 Palokangas, Exploding Wilderness: Guerrilla-Type Activities in the Finnish Art of War, 278. 
46 See more about speed, surprise, and relative superiority from William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case 
Studies in Special Operations Warfare; Theory and Practice (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).  
47 Many other Elite units in history had had the same kind of experience, for example, German 
Stormtroopers. See Bruce I. Gudmundsson, “Special Tactics Units” in Stormtroop Tactics, Innovation in 
the German Army 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1989), 44–48. 
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After this move, it was quite easy to build up good relationships between Army SOF and 
the Helicopter Wing with its Mi-8 helicopters. 
Basic specialized training of conscripts had been quite the same for decades. Soon 
after the regiment was established, it started Special Jaeger training beginning with the 
conscripts. In 1999, UTJR began to train a cadre of non-commissioned officers, called the 
Training and Standby Team (Koulutus- ja valmiusosasto),48 in the most demanding tasks. 
The new era of the Finnish Special Forces had begun in Utti. In 2002, the Special Jaegers 
(both conscripts and non-commissioned officers) received their development program, 
which was initially a plan to buy equipment.49 Later, the development program was 
expanded to include programs in how to develop SF personnel.  
In 2004, Finnish Defence Minister Seppo Kääriäinen gave a speech in which he 
announced that the Special Jaeger Battalion would be established in Utti in 2005.50  At the 
beginning of that year, there were organizational changes inside the UTJR and in the 
Finnish Defence Forces. The Special Jaeger Battalion was established, but command and 
control was dropped from the upper level in the Army Command. After two battalions were 
established under the regiment, there was discussion about how to lead these units. One 
problem was clear: there were only few persons in the higher commands to tell decision 
makers about FINSOF tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
By the end of 2010, the helicopter battalion had enough personnel and money to 
become a modern, capable unit with new NH-90 helicopters.51 There was already a plan to 
develop helicopter tactics and techniques to respond to the threats and tasks of the new 
security environment. Later on, the helicopter battalion started to develop its own special 
aviation unit (the Special Operations Air Task Unit, or SOATU), with better-equipped 
helicopters.  
                                                 
48 Seppo Kääriäinen, “Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa” (speech, 40-year celebration of 
Parachute Jaeger Club, in Finland, March 27, 2004). 
https://www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/puheet/2004/puolustusministeri_seppo_kaariainen_puhe_laskuvarjojaa
karikillan_40-vuotisjuhlassa.1969.news?1952_o=20. 
49 Seppo Kääriäinen,”Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa.”  
50 Seppo Kääriäinen,”Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa.”  
51 Seppo Kääriäinen,”Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa”  
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Between 2005 and 2013, the UTJR developed a suitable command and control (C2) 
structure and acquired the equipment to lead the Helicopter and the Special Jaeger 
Battalions in all the basic Finnish Defence Forces tasks. In the beginning of the 2000s, the 
challenging part was participation as an SOF in International Crisis Management. 
Nonetheless, this part has enabled the regiment to deploy its forces abroad, which will be 
a vital capability in the future as FINSOF takes on this new task of providing and receiving 
international assistance (see the Appendix D, Finnish Defence Forces Tasks.) Meanwhile, 
progress has been made in terms of tactical level directives, orders, and statements, which 
has raised the value of FINSOF.52 
2. Finnish Navy Special Operations Forces 
The Finnish Navy divers started their underwater work with very heavy equipment 
during World War I. Over several decades, the jobs performed by these divers were 
primarily underwater repairs, construction work, and rescue missions. After World War II, 
there were 50 divers in the navy but their main jobs remained underwater work, not military 
operations.53  
Technological development and the need for divers capable of conducting military 
operations led to a new era in the Finnish Navy. The first Finnish military divers' course 
was held in 1954, focused on basic training methods, experiences, and information 
provided by Sweden in 1953.54 Nowadays we can say that this was the starting point of the 
Finnish Navy’s SOF development and training.  
The Finnish Navy trained its first assault divers in their own courses beginning in 
1963, with all students as trainers and with its first conscripts in 1964. Later on, these divers 
got the name combat divers and their training was mixed with diving techniques and special 
                                                 
52 Hans Ilis Alm, “Swedish Special Operation Forces: How It all Started,” in Special Operations from 
a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges, ed. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson,  (Cham, 
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 16–19. After participating in the EU operation Artemis 2003 in 
Congo, SWESOF received a lot of credibility, which raised their value. 
53 Matti Anttila and Antti Ellonen, Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen 
Historia, 2nd ed. (Helsinki: Koala kustannus, 2016), 16. 
54 Anttila et al., Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia, 19–24. 
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operations in the coastal waters.55 There were also mine clearance and work diver courses 
in the Finnish Navy, which served the needs of the Finnish Defence Forces. Development 
of the divers’ training was done in response to the global tensions and military activities 
during the Cold War. When training of the combat divers needed more development in the 
late 1980s, the Finnish Navy sent one of its officers to U.S. SEAL training.56 This training 
started a new era in the Finnish Defence Forces divers’ development, especially with 
combat divers.  
The Coastal Jaeger School needs a paragraph here because, during the time it 
existed, many ideas came alive about how to conduct special operations in the coastal and 
archipelago environment. A coastal battalion was established under the Finnish Army after 
World War II to conduct operations in the coastal water of Finland. Development in the 
Finnish Defence Forces during the 1970s led to the establishment of the Coastal Jaeger 
School to conduct special operations in the coastal areas of Finland. The Coastal Jaeger 
School trained its combat divers in cooperation with the combat diver courses and it shared 
the same base with them.57 The Coastal Jaeger School disbanded in 1989 because there 
was no vision for how to develop this specially trained unit and because the unit was 
operating in the navy’s backyard under the army organization. Furthermore, there was no 
guidance provided to the unit about who was responsible for what in the coastal areas. The 
time was not right for this kind of unit and the organization was wrong. 
The first Finnish Navy Special Forces team started in 1993 with small number of 
operators as a test. In 2000, the professional unit was further developed under the Navy 
Diver School, and in 2009, it became its own Navy Special Forces Unit 
(ETO=Erikoistoimintaosasto).58 Interoperability between the Finnish Army and the Navy 
SOF units has been good. Training, exercises, and operations abroad together, such as the 
                                                 
55 Anttila et al., Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia, 39–40. 
56 Anttila et al., Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia, 55–56. 
57 M. Mökkönen, “Rannikkojääkäri on Valiosotilas, Suomalainen Commandomies,” Rannikon 
Puolustaja, June 1980, 4. 
58 Anttila and Ellonen, Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia,  57–59. 
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multinational exercise Trident Juncture 2018, have developed the FINSOF spirit between 
these two units.59  
3. Finnish Special Operations Forces of the Ministry of Interior 
The Finnish police have nowadays one special operations qualified unit, called 
Karhu—the Bear, with its main base in the capital, Helsinki. This unit was established in 
1972 to be the readiness and security team for the 1975 ETYK meeting (Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Helsinki. One of the reasons for the unit’s 
establishment was the terrorist strike at the Munich Olympics in 1972.60 Although it had 
only 15 men at the time, the Bear did the work necessary to become a readiness unit with 
the new capability to take on high-risk situations. Given basic tasks was at first, it was 
responsible for counterterrorism missions and high-risk arrest missions in various security 
situations. The Bear soon became the unit Finnish police can use all over Finland and, if 
necessary, abroad. The unit was initially structured as a small military unit with elements 
of command team, technical team, terror bomb team, and operator teams.61         
After 9/11, the Bear unit was strengthened and given more resources and 
equipment. The unit achieved a very professional level, with about 50 to 100 operators 
overall.62 The cooperation with the Finnish Army and Navy Special Forces started soon 
after 2001 at the unit level, and since then it has had good ties with other specialized units. 
In this work, I mention this unit among the Finnish Special Operations forces for several 
reasons: first, its operators are chosen from men and women who volunteered and were 
tested; second, its tasks are high-risk operationally and strategically, and are meaningfully 
                                                 
59 Thomas Nilsen, “The Northern Sweden and Finland Play Key Role as NATO Kicks off Trident 
Juncture,” The Barents Observer, last modified October 23, 2018, 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2018/10/nato. 
60 Britannica, s.v. “Munich Massacre,” accessed August 11, 2018, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Massacre. A Palestinian terrorist cell took Israeli athletes as 
hostages, but the event ended in a massacre and ten hostages died along with one police officer and five 
terrorists. 
61 Poliisihallitus, “Karhu on Maan Toimintakykyisin Operatiivinen Poliisiyksikkö,” Poliisilehti, no. 4 
(2004), http://www.poliisilehti.fi. 
62 Silva Laakso, “Näin Toimivat Suomen Poliisin Erikoisjoukot – Kun Poliisilla on Edessä Pahin 
Mahdollinen Tilanne, Paikalle Hälytetään Karhu-Ryhmä,” Ilta-Sanomat, March 30, 2018, 
https://www.is.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005623118.html. 
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defined; third, the Finnish Police use the unit all over the operational area; fourth, it is 
capable of working and cooperating with other special forces from Finland and from other 
countries, too. 
Both maritime and land Border Guard readiness teams were established in 1992. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was fear that refugees and crime would impact 
Finland’s eastern border. There was a need for specialized trained units to strengthen 
security in the border areas. After a quick decision, seven units of the Border Guard Special 
Forces were established. Their tasks included counterterrorism and counter crime tasks 
with special tactics in the border areas. After several years of developing the original units, 
the Border Guard Special Forces themselves had become a professional cadre to handle 
difficult and high-risk situations in Finland’s border areas.63  
The Border Guard established a specialized training center in the eastern part of 
Finland where it started to train selected conscripts as Special Jaegers in 2007. Nowadays 
the Border Guard has two special forces units and an SOF conscript training unit. Together 
these units of the Finnish Border Guard have become part of FINSOF.    
4. Lessons Learned from History 
The history of FINSOF has traced the roots of the SOF family. As we have seen, 
each unit within the different organizations was raised to meet the needs of its time. Tactics 
and techniques came from guerilla-type tactics behind enemy lines and long-range 
patrolling. These techniques were formulated by the first units and tasks in the army and 
navy. Units in the Ministry of Interior were established as well when there was a threat of 
violence caused by outside non-state attackers. The continuation of the training from World 
War II to these days has been an important link of the FINSOF.  That training was 
connected directly to the required tasks (see Figure 4). 
                                                 
63 Teemu Tumelius, Rajavartiolaitoksen 5. Valmiusjoukkue: sisäisen ja ulkoisen turvallisuuden 
merellinen erikoisjoukko 1997-2017 (Helsinki: Nord Print Oy, 2017), 9. 
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Figure 4.  FINSOF tasks’ transformation, from World War II tasks to 2017. 
The units are divided based on their operative use: the military was meant to operate 
during wartime while Ministry of Interior units were meant to be used during peacetime to 
provide interior security. Formerly, this divide was clear but nowadays the line between 
peace and war is not so clear. This gray zone time has brought units from the military and 
the Ministry of Interior closer to each other. Because the different kinds of units and their 
different traditions, there are still gaps in FINSOF that need to be fixed in the future. (See 
the Appendix E, Organization of the FINSOF Units.) 
For a long time the Finnish Army and Navy SOF were mainly training units, which 
created a large number of usable reserves. Conscript service members and reservists gave 
FINSOF its unique capabilities and opportunities to use different kinds of experts from the 
civilian world as part of the SOF. This demonstrated will of the main population to defend 
its own country provides motivated conscripts every year to the training. The basic one-
year training gives special operations forces three valuable benefits. First, it gives FINSOF 
the recruitment basis for the more advanced special operations operator and officer jobs as 
well as for jobs offered in the Ministry of Interior. Secondly, it gives special operations 
forces a reliable reserve structure and network, whose members can acquire specialized 
skillsets from the civilian world by, for example, training as surgeons. Third, it has created 
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a civilian network through reservists that ties the military closer to civilian society, which 
is useful for developing crisis-time plans and coordination with these people.  
B. FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
Military doctrine gives guidelines to the troops and military organizations about the 
use of their capabilities. It provides baselines from which capabilities can evolve, and is 
important for future development. Yet, Finnish special operations have no specific Finnish 
doctrine to guide them. 
The Finnish Defence Forces use an overall national defence doctrine, but with 
separate doctrines for Land, Naval, and Air operations. There are also some doctrines or 
guidelines for the separate capabilities within the FDF, such as information operations. The 
FDF view FINSOF as part of the Joint effects doctrine, an element of the kinetic effect-
based operations that support the main operation. This lack of a specific SOF doctrine led 
FINSOF to look to NATO for doctrine. Beginning in early 2000, FINSOF adopted most of 
NATO’s basic principles and tasks, using the baselines of Allied Joint Publication AJP-
3.5.  
According to AJP-3.5, the SOF are a strategic asset that can be used against 
strategical and operational level objectives to achieve high level goals.64 In Finland, this 
principle has not been clear to all during the development of the FINSOF. Nonetheless, in 
Finland there needs to be ongoing writing process for an own SOF doctrine. This FINSOF 
doctrine should be tailored to Finnish national needs, the overall defence doctrine, and 
matters of a special nature, such as mandatory conscript service. As Colin Gray writes, “the 
strategic value of special operations forces depends not just on how well or poorly they 
perform, but also on how important for the war as a whole are their assigned missions.”65    
Dennis Gyllensporre recommends that doctrine should follow the principles of the 
small defensive state, and the special operations should focus on two different times, pre-
                                                 
64 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–1. 
65 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 85. 
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war operations and wartime operations, because these two seem to be two different 
operation sets:  
- During the pre-war with covert hostile actions, the strategic 
principle should be a deterrence to prevent escalated conflict, guided 
by direct defence measures to maintain asymmetry. Special 
operations would primarily be engaged in enhancing the nations’ 
resilience and countering special enemy operations and covert 
action with direct defence. Support of national civilian authorities’ 
capacity building is key. Later, the aim may change to induce a rapid 
conflict escalation by striking HVT’s [High-value targets] to engage 
other states in the conflict.   
- During the war with overt operations by the aggressor. At this point, 
the strategic principle transitions to attrition to exhaust the enemy, 
guided by guerilla warfare strategy measures to maintain 
asymmetry. Special operations support regular forces. Raids, in-
country and at the enemy’s home bases, will induce losses and 
friction and ultimately degrade the aggressor’s will to sustain 
offensive actions. In late phases, Special Forces should facilitate 
resistance movements in occupied regions.66 
1. Finnish Special Operations Tasks 
NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations assigned three main tasks to 
SOF: Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Military Assistance (MA).67 
It is important to note that these tasks are broadly defined. Special operations can be divided 
into the operations conducted on the land, in the air, at sea, or in combination. In addition, 
the approach in each of these operations can vary from direct to indirect, depending on the 
environment, adversary, end state, and conditions.  
In Finland, FINSOF has used NATO tasks, based on AJP-3.5, as part of the Finnish 
Defence Forces’ main tasks, and in figuring out how to apply these overall tasks to local 
situations and environment. For example, as part of the overall defence of Finland, DA can 
mean sabotage strikes, ambushes, boarding operations, and terminal guidance tasks as part 
                                                 
66 Dennis Gyllensporre, “Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations 
Theory,” in Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges, ed. Gunilla 
Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 35–36. 
67 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 2–1 – 2–7. 
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of the Joint fires behind enemy lines; SR can mean strategic intelligence tasks against an 
enemy’s formations, target acquisition, and area assessment; MA can mean advice and 
training or support to conventional forces or other authorities. Military SOF have also done 
complementary Counter Terrorism (CT) tasks, air (SOF Air) tasks, and maritime tasks 
(SOF Maritime). CT in Finland is marked as a police job, but if we recognize the Police 
Special Forces as a part of the SOF family, then these tasks can be viewed as part of the 
SOF main tasks. 
In operations abroad, MA has been the principal SOF core task, which has given 
the organization operational and tactical experiences, cooperation and collaboration with 
other units, and strategical visibility. A wide range of SOF capabilities have been included 
under the term Military Assistance, but the main effort through operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq has been the Building Partner Nation capabilities. This experience can be used to 
train other national capabilities as well, such as teaching this specific skillset to 
conventional forces if necessary. Because the nature of MA is wide, it gives FINSOF 
several possibilities to develop SOF performance.  
FINSOF uses NATO’s special operations mission criteria to evaluate its tasks. 
These criteria address whether a task is Permissible, which means that FINSOF has the 
mandate to do the tasked operation within the rules of engagement (ROE). A task must be 
Appropriate, Feasible, and suitable for FINSOF, and FINSOF must have the capability to 
conduct the task with its available assets, who must have the special skills required; the 
operation must also meet the commander’s objectives. The task must be Sustainable, which 
means that the target is appropriate to FINSOF and the operation itself is supported with 
available assets and capabilities. Finally, the task must be Justifiable, where the risks and 
benefits of the task are in balance and the task is suitable for FINSOF.68   
Due to a lack of dedicated resources, FINSOF needs help from other capabilities to 
be effective. This assistance may come from other authorities in Finland, from 
conventional troops, or from partner forces from other nations. As part of a comprehensive 
approach to defence, FINSOF must consider its cooperation and compatibility with other 
                                                 
68 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–6. 
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units and organizations. In particular, the interoperability FINSOF gained from operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq is still valuable to maintain so that it can cooperate with NATO 
SOF units, giving and receiving support if necessary.69  
Furthermore, the organizational structure has been tailored by the task because a 
limited employment force must be optimized in a small country. Future conflicts will 
require strong flexible structures, as well as networks with advanced communication and 
personal ties to operate effectively, which is why the structure must be tailored at the 
tactical and sometimes the operational level.70 FINSOF’s structure has normally consisted 
of six main elements: command, action, action support, direct support, enablers, and the 
liaison element to the higher echelon (see Figure 5). This structure has formulated 
organizations according to each task, where every part has had a very important part in 
getting the job done. A task-related organization that involves more than 100 people is 
called as Special Operations Task Group, SOTG, while one involving fewer than 100 
people is called a Special Operations Task Force, SOTF.  
 
Figure 5.  Finnish Special Operations Task Group and Task Force structure. 
                                                 
69 FINSOF has been several times in Afghanistan with different tasks, most recently with Advise and 
Assist task. The latest operation was in Iraq in Operation Inherent Resolve and that was also Advise and 
Assist task. See more examples from The Finnish Defence Forces, “Irak OIR,” Accessed October 23, 2018, 
https://puolustusvoimat.fi/web/kansainvalinen-kriisinhallinta/irak-oir-.  
70 John Arquilla and David Ronfeld, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 




Capable information technology and information systems give this tailored 
structure the tools to reach its targets with sufficient information and situational awareness. 
The right structure has also provided for cooperation and communication between 
elements, so that even if computer and information systems fail, the organization can do 
its tasks to the end without them.71 The only feature this structure has lacked is the efficient 
or proper connections to the strategical level.     
2. Finnish Special Operations Forces Limitations 
The first major limitation for FINSOF is its peacetime strength. Only a small 
number of operators join each unit annually, and the overall strength of the units is not 
increased because there are always operators who quit each year. The Finnish office-holder 
structure allows some additions per year, but large changes need parliamentary 
preparations and legislative changes. Limits on the numbers mean that FINSOF Task 
Forces need support from other military units, other authorities, and civil agencies. For 
example, during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the FINSOTF was supported by 
individuals from the reserves, police, border guard and conventional units. Finland is 
currently able to keep one SOTF abroad and one task force in the homeland at the same 
time, provided there is no crisis at home. 
International operations cannot become a priority for Finnish special operations, 
because the overall defence policy is based on the threat posed by Russia. Whenever there 
is a possibility for Finnish forces to participate in international operations, the value to 
Finland and its forces must be evaluated. As Ronny Modig states in his analysis in The 
Utility of Special Operations in Small States: “the effect when SO are employed is 
enhanced by the myth of a handful of heroes,”72 Which means that it will cost too much to 
                                                 
71 C. Kenneth Allard, “The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information 
Warfare,” in Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy, ed. L. Benjamin Ederington and 
Michael J. Mazarr (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 188. 
72 Ronny Modigs, “The Utility of Special Operations in Small States,” in Special Operations from a 
Small State Perspective, New Security Challenges, eds. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrika Pettersson (Cham, 
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillian, 2017), 43–63. 
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send specially trained soldiers to the other side of the world if the job does not require 
special operators. 
 The second main limitation concerns the structures and command and control 
system of FINSOF. There is a working structure at the task force level to handle SOF 
missions together, but the lack of a coherent official operational or strategic command and 
control system causes misunderstanding and friction in practice. For example, coordination 
and cooperation as part of the Joint operation can be difficult to gain without unified 
command at the right level. As Espen Berg-Knutsen highlighted in his Combating 
Terrorism Exchange article, “Requirements for speed, security, and coordination also 
imply the need for a flat and flexible SOF organizational structure … [as] reducing the 
number of bureaucratic, hierarchical layers between the special operator and decision 
maker means quicker decisions, reduced risk of miscommunication, better control, and 
increased operational security in both planning and execution phases.”73 The recognition 
of a need to establish the permanent SOF Command structure as a part of the Finnish 
Defence Forces or some comprehensive Joint structures could be the answer to many 
coordination problems, and such a permanent structure could also allow FINSOF to be 
used if needed against hybrid threats. The decision making could then be connected to the 
Prime Minister’s Office if the question concerned the Nation’s security issues or using 
FINSOF abroad to assist other countries. 
As mentioned previously, speed and time management are the essence of war. For 
the small state, these can be especially decisive during a crisis.74 The FINSOF can use their 
flexibility and adaptability to increase their speed and gain the element of surprise against 
                                                 
73 Espen Berg-Knutsen, “From Tactical Champions to Grand Strategy Enablers: The Future of Small-
Nation SOF in Counter-Hybrid Warfare,” Combating Terrorism Exchange 6, no. 4 (November 2016): 66, 
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74 Samuel Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 134. 
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an adversary.75 Surprise requires situational awareness delivered by an effective 
intelligence structure.  
Intelligence, on the other hand, characterizes the third limitation facing FINSOF. 
Although FINSOF missions produce intelligence, they also need support from intelligence. 
FINSOF has some tactical intelligence assets, but a lack of operational level assets and 
analysis capability can have a devastating effect. As Erwin Rommel said, “report 
observations rapidly, for delay lessens the value of any information.”76 FINSOF needs at 
least cooperation and coordination with the intelligence community to share information.  
The fourth limitation concerns SOF-dedicated aviation. FINSOF has only a small 
number of special helicopter aviators as part of the Army SOF, and they can work as a 
small unit inside the SOF structure, specifically as Special Operations Air Task Unit 
(SOATU) (rotary-wing). The Finnish Air Force lacks a SOATU as well; even they have 
fixed-wing pilots who work with SOF.  
C. CONCLUSION 
FINSOF has become a long way to the point what it is today, but there are still steps 
to take in the future. Putting together existed capabilities, FINSOF is capable of execute 
demanding operations. FINSOF could become more effective if certain functions, 
processes, and capabilities be renewed in the future.    
Command and Control 
The lack of unity within the FINSOF Command element is a challenging issue, but 
it can be fixed. Efficient command and control needs to understand and take into account 
the FINSOF as a whole, with the elements of its capabilities, its effects, and overall costs.77 
                                                 
75 McRaven finds in his study that relative superiority over an enemy can be achieved through 
Planning, Preparation, and Execution, and the key elements; what leads to the success are Simplicity, 
Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed, and Purpose. See William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in 
Special Operations Warfare; Theory and Practice (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 8–11. 
76 Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 6. 
77 Berndt Horn, “Operationalizing SOF Theory: A Function of Understanding SOF Power,” in Special 
Operations Theory, eds. Paul Lieber and Peter McCabe, Vol. 17–6 (McDill Air Force Base, FL: JSOU 
Press, 2017), 65. 
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At the same time there is a need to solve manning issues of the higher echelons. Capable 
staff needs training and basic skills to become an efficient FINSOF command and control 
structure. 
Flexibility 
The Finnish Army Special Operations Forces have been the main development 
engine in thinking about cooperation and integration between services and different 
ministries. Development and innovation have come from the bottom of the organization 
and worked their way up. The key to adapting to new situations has been flexibility of 
force, which Meir Finkel described in his book On Flexibility as a “combination of well-
organized command, organizational, and technological elements supported by suitable 
doctrine.”78 Flexibility itself is the key to the element of surprise. 
Availability 
FINSOF’s flexibility to operate in complex environments with little logistical 
assistance provides Finnish decision makers a capability that they can use quickly in 
missions at home or abroad.79 The Finnish special operations need support from different 
partners at home, and if deployed abroad, from coalition or partner nations. Such operations 
need well-trained and dedicated staff to coordinate missions as part of the main operation.  
Efficiency 
During decades of hard work, the FINSOF have taken on more tasks as their 
“toolbox” has grown larger. Despite the growing amount of tasks and overlapping duties, 
the process itself has brought together services and ministries and barriers between them 
has eroded. Overlapping duties need to be reshape in the upcoming doctrine of FINSOF. 
Efficiency can be determined through specific core tasks assigned to each unit. 
Nevertheless, it is important to maintain complementary tasks because it is mandatory that 
these units can assist one another.  
                                                 
78 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility – Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the 
Battlefield. trans. Moshe Tlamin (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 2. 
79 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–3; “High tempo is normally essential to 
SOF’s ability to conduct special operations.” 
 30 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 31 
III. FINLAND’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
It’s that things are being considered in advance and imagining the case 
aloud so that when it happens, the routes are clear, this is the one that 
has been harnessed for a long time, who is it, so be it, but there are two 
bad things in this race; it does not happen or it does happen differently. 




The most important external factor in Finland’s security policy is its geographic 
location and the political impacts it brings with it—in other words, geopolitics. Its location 
in the northeast edge of Europe and the European Union has affected Finland’s behavior 
in the international field, which has been struggling between Finnish border state policy 
issues and its neighbor, Russia (see Appendix F, Map of Europe with NATO and EU 
Boundaries). Finland’s relations and security policy toward other countries and 
organizations can be revealed through its relations with Russia.81 Without Russia’s 
presence and actions near Finland’s borders and elsewhere, Finland’s security policy would 
have been very different. This chapter focuses on Russian threats to Finland, and on 
Finland’s security policy responding to those threats. 
Russia is acting as a regional superpower and raising its military capacity with 
aggressive power politics and hard-line rhetoric. It has used this capacity and will together 
to threaten other states since 1997, notably with its latest cross-border territorial aggression 
occurring in Ukraine in 2014. These acts of aggression have combined different capabilities 
from various Russian authorities to conduct effective hybrid warfare. This Russian threat 
                                                 
80 By fictional character Konsta Pylkkänen, Veikko Huovinen, Havukka-Ahon Ajattelija (Helsinki: 
WSOY, 1952), 83. Translation by the author, using help with Google translator October 18, 2018.  
81 Limnéll writes about four factors, which are 1) the continued existence of a military capability in the 
area adjacent to Finland, 2) uncertainty about developments in Russia, 3) Finland’s geographical location, 
and 4) the lessons of history. Jarmo Limnéll, Finnish Threat Perception Policy in the Early Years of the 
21st Century, Finnish Defence Studies 19 (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2012), 135–137, 
http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2363-4. 
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potential is the main yardstick against which Finland’s defence capabilities are measured 
and evaluated.  
Furthermore, Finland’s security environment is affected by threats other than those 
from Russia. Besides the traditional military threats, issues concerning overall security 
policy include changing climate issues, scarcity of energy resources, population growth 
and refugee movements, global terrorism, organized crime, cyberattacks, and the 
increasing vulnerability of modern society.82 Therefore, Finland needs to invest in other 
safety-promoting and threat-preventing measures. Nevertheless, this study focuses on these 
security issues only insofar as they are involved in Russian threats against Finland.  
A. FINLAND’S LINE OF LIFE, THE BALTIC SEA 
The Baltic Sea has become as a stage of Russia’s drama called: how to achieve 
Kremlin’s geopolitical objectives. This small sea has important meaning to Finland. Next 
sub-chapter highlights this manner. 
1. The Meaning of the Baltic Sea to Finland 
The Baltic Sea is the key to Finland’s ability to survive. Over 90 percent of 
Finland’s trade moves via the Baltic Sea, highlighting the great importance of the sea and 
its islands in relation to Finland’s economy and its ability to survive. This is commonly 
known in the Nordic countries as well in the Baltic States.83 According to research from 
the Heritage Foundation, “The location of the Åland, Gotland, and Bornholm islands are 
strategically important to security in the Baltic Sea. Russia has long recognized the value 
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March 15, 2013), 17–18, 
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of these islands and has even carried out military training exercises that simulated capturing 
them.”84   
In 2016, a RAND report stated that NATO’s eastern border lacks a defensive 
capability, especially in the Baltic States area, including the Baltic Sea, which has 
significant implications for Finland’s security.85 The report has spurred a debate in Finland 
and Sweden about what NATO’s role in the Baltic Sea area should be and how the 
organization should reply if Russia were to begin hostile military actions in the same area.86  
Correspondingly, all scenarios in this study are based on potential acts of aggression 
by Russia against its neighboring countries. Russia’s aggression will use tools and elements 
of hybrid warfare and will follow the basics of the Russian military doctrine.87 The Russian 
fleet in the Baltic Sea, which operates out of Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, has the key 
role. One of its tasks is to ensure Russia’s territorial integrity and deter NATO. From 
Finland’s point of view, the Russian fleet’s capability to do Anti Access/Area Denial 
(A2AD) operations can disrupt both the sea lines of communication in the Baltic Sea88 and 
the critical trade lines to the Baltic Sea’s northern coasts (see Figure 6).89  
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Figure 6.  Three islands key to Baltic security.90 
2. Finland’s Relations with the Baltic Sea Western Military Powers  
Finland’s relations with its neighbor Sweden have long been quite close. One of the 
reasons for this kind of extraordinary relationship is based on history; Finland was part of 
Sweden for over 400 years, from the 14th century to 1809. Another reason has been 
Sweden’s geopolitical status includes guarding the Baltic Sea sea-routes and allowing 
Finland based data flow to go through his region, and a third reason has been that both 
Finland and Sweden have had a policy of non-alliance towards military pacts like NATO.91  
Finland also has a bilateral agreement with Sweden concerning military issues.92 
This bilateral agreement does not provide the same kind of cover that NATO Article 5 
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promises, but the agreement gives Finland and Sweden more ties of military cooperation 
and partnership with the mentioned country. In addition, the bilateral agreement is based 
on UN Article 51 issues that every country has its basic right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN.93 This cooperation 
raises the threshold for use of force against Finland.  
Another military power in the Baltic Sea area is NATO. The cooperation between 
Finland and NATO developed after the Cold War when Finland wanted to join the 
Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)94 to get access to NATO’s 
standardization process. It is likely that a desire to buy military material from Western 
countries drove Finland’s political leaders to negotiate with NATO leaders in the first 
place.  
B. RUSSIA AS A THREAT 
Russian military activity near Finland’s borders has caused Finland to see Russia 
as a main threat. Next sub-chapter is about Russia’s threat.  
1. Russia’s Deterrence 
Finland’s border with Russia is 840 miles long, and this border has seen several 
conflicts over the past 700 years. For centuries the border has moved in one direction or 
another. Since Finland gained its independence in 1917, Russia (formerly the Soviet 
Union) has been a contentious neighbor.95  
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was overrun by black markets and 
criminals, and started to deteriorate. Tightened budget deficits and discipline under Boris 
Yeltsin in early 2000 turned the state in a more stable direction, and Russia started 
                                                 
93 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (June 26, 
1945): Chapter VII, Article 51, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/. 
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development programs to increase its military capacity. Consequently, Russian military 
development and capabilities have been significantly strengthened since the beginning of 
the 21st century, due to funding of programs supporting the military and other security 
ministries. (See Appendix G, Comparison of Defense Expenditure and Military Personnel 
with Countries adjacent the Baltic Sea). Conventional military capabilities deterrence 
refers to measures against those capabilities, which must adapt in response. Therefore, we 
can say that conventional Russian deterrence is aimed against conventional threats, which 
means non-nuclear weapons capacity with different types of platforms for its units and 
subunits.96  
These development programs are part of the Russian National Security Strategy 
(RNSS). The RNSS highlights political confrontation between Russia and the West, and it 
clearly indicates that Russia opposes the expansion of NATO and the presence of U.S. 
troops near its borders, especially in the Baltic States. The RNSS states that Russia will 
protect its national interests; this protection can be described as an aggressive defense 
policy. For example, Russia has improved its precision-guided missile systems to prevent 
escalation, but it can use these systems as necessary as protection tools.97 Russia clarified 
its policy against the countries near its borders and directly informed the West that if there 
are any threats towards Russia, it will take action to neutralize that threat.98  
Furthermore, in the beginning of 2007, Russia began a series of joint exercises 
designed to develop its ability to lead large military operations and improve mobility and 
readiness. Figure 7 highlights one such exercise, Zapad2017, which Russia conducted with 
Belarus in September 2017. These exercises have included all dimensions of the battlefield 
and all arms and branches from the armed forces and supporting ministries. The exercises 
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indicate that Russia is preparing to fight a high-tempo conventional war against a 
sophisticated opposing force.99 This detail is meaningful in light of Russia’s overall 
capabilities.  
 
Figure 7.  Russia Zapad2017 exercise according to Germany’s Bild magazine.100 
Even though it still has its strategic nuclear capacity, Russia is preparing to use 
conventional weapons and hybrid warfare against opposing forces or capabilities. Ideas to 
focus on more local, smaller scale wars came from the Soviet time; it was already part of 
Russia’s military strategy.101 These methods inherited from Soviet times were shaped by 
Russia during its wars against insurgents near its southern border, in the Chechen wars, 
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and through the ongoing conflicts in Dagestan.102 Such capabilities could be used against 
Finland and its neighboring countries. As the exercise Zapad2017 clearly demonstrated, 
Russia also knows the importance of the Baltic Sea.  
As a part of the RNSS, Russia continues its strategic-deterrence means against the 
West. These include economic, political, and ideological means, and scientific measures, 
which must coordinate with military means and non-military means. Military means with 
offensive and defensive capabilities include conventional weapons such as precision strike 
capabilities and units. One new deterrent ability that Russia has now is its ability to strike 
and fight with new remote-controlled weapons and platforms.103 Non-military means such 
as influence and information operations are the keys to delivering strategic effects in order 
to further Russia’s goals. We can conclude that non-military means can be effective 
without military means to get to the desired end state; at the least, these means can obscure 
the operational area, and give an advantage to the attacker.104 Robert Leonhard wrote as 
early as 1998 that the next century would give leaders a new possibility to use information 
as a way to get an advantage over adversaries,105 just as hybrid warfare does. 
2. Russia’s Hybrid Warfare 
Russia places a lot of emphasis on the use of non-military measures instead of hard 
power measures to influence the population and to obscure the true meaning of an 
operation. To understand the methods of Russian hybrid warfare, it is important to be 
familiar with the principle of Sun Tzu, that “All warfare is based on deception”106 or the 
                                                 
102 First Chechen War 1994–1996 and the second Chechen War 1999–2009, conflict in Dagestan is 
ongoing; see, for example: Yagil Henkin, “From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: The Evolution of 
Chechen Terrorism, 1995–2004,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 1–2 (December 1, 2006): 193–203, 
https://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/02634930600903270; and Ariel Cohen, “A 
Threat to the West: The Rise of Islamist Insurgency in the Northern Caucasus and Russia’s Inadequate 
Response,” Backgrounder, no. 2643 (Mar 26, 2012), 1–17, https://www.heritage.org/global-
politics/report/threat-the-west-the-rise-islamist-insurgency-the-northern-caucasus. 
103 Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 13. 
104 Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 14–15. 
105 Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age, 49. 
106 Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66. 
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Soviet term Maskirovka. According to David Glantz: “The Soviets categorize maskirovka 
as strategic, operational, and tactical … by definition, maskirovka includes both active and 
passive measures designed to deceive and surprise the enemy.”107 In Ukraine 2014, Russia 
used a broad range of deception from the concept of Maskirovka as well as hard military 
tools such as special operations forces, unmanned aerial vehicles and precision strike 
capabilities.108 Concentrating the combined hybrid effects together, Russia achieved its 
goals rapidly.  
Russia’s hybrid warfare method, based on a model developed by Russian Chief of 
General Staff Valery Gerasimov, includes different phases and actions for the development 
of the crisis (see Figure 8: The Gerasimov model).109 Phases start from Covert Origins and 
end with Restoration of Peace. The other phases are Escalation, Start of the Conflict 
Activities, Crisis, and Resolution. During the development of the crisis, the potential 
military threat rises to the military conflict level (indicated by light and dark orange in the 
upper triangle). Under the phases are two basic methods to use against adversaries: military 
(indicated by gray) and non-military (indicated by light blue) means, which are situated 
during certain phases; for example, non-military means of political pressure can be used 
during phases three to five.   
                                                 
107 David M. Glantz, “The Red Mask: The Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception in the 
Second World War,” Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (1987), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431907, 178–179. 
108 Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 19. 
109 Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” originally from Valery 
Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, originally published in his article “The 
Value of Science in Prediction” Military-Industrial Courier, February 27, 2013. 
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Figure 8.  The Gerasimov model.110 
The Gerasimov model of hybrid warfare is adapted from old ideas about ways to 
use different kinds of capabilities together to gain the desired effect or solution. A RAND 
report by Christopher Chivvis describes hybrid warfare as having three key characteristics: 
It economizes the use of force. Recognizing Russia would stand little 
chance of winning a protracted conventional conflict with NATO, 
Moscow seeks instead to pursue its interests without overt use of 
military power if possible. Russia may still use its conventional and 
even nuclear threats as part of a Hybrid strategy, but in general, it prefers 
to minimize the actual employment of traditional military force. The use 
of cyber tools is an excellent example of one way in which Russia 
economizes on the use of force. 
It is persistent. Hybrid war breaks down the traditional binary 
delineation between war and peace. The reality of Hybrid war is the 
ever-changing intensity of the conflict. Hybrid war strategies are always 
underway, although at certain moments they may become more acute 
and intense or cross over into conventional combat operations. 
                                                 
110 Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.” 
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It is population-centric. Russian military experts have watched as the 
United States and its allies fought in the Balkans, the Middle East, and 
elsewhere over the course of the last quarter-century. They seized upon 
the importance of an approach that seeks to influence the population of 
target countries through information operations, proxy groups, and other 
influence operations. Russia uses Hybrid warfare to work within 
existing political and social frameworks to further Russian 
objectives.111 
These characteristics mean that Russia can use means and troops other than conventional 
forces to capture territory or other spaces. This does not mean that it cannot use 
conventional forces, but operations can be more asymmetric and Joint than before. These 
operations are supported heavily with influence operations and deception, which need more 
governmental actions and capabilities than just military to lead to success. Gerasimov 
himself has said that today’s modern conflicts need four times more non-military means 
than military means.112 
In addition, the lack of knowledge about Russian strategy leaves lots of room for 
wrong conclusions and speculation. This is why the Russian strategy seems based on given 
possibilities, and there is no single operational line of it to follow. Russia has broad 
opportunistic political objectives, which seek the vulnerabilities of other countries in order 
to, as Mark Galeotti suggests, distract, divide, and demoralize the other nations.113 Galeotti 
further mentions that operations can be coordinated, and can use basic military principles 
such as breaking the chains of command, jamming communications, and other means in 
order to gain success. Recognizing Russia’s exact interests and strategy toward its 
adversaries remains a challenge. 
 
                                                 
111 Christopher Chivvis, Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done about It 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 2, emphasis added. 
112 Chivvis, Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done about It, 2–3. 
113 Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’” Foreign Policy Magazine, 
March 5, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine. 
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C. FINLAND’S STRATEGY AGAINST THREATS 
Today’s security threats are characterized by difficult predictability and short 
warning times. Many threats and risks to Finland are transboundary and have wide-ranging 
implications. In recent years Finland has faced the truth that there are several hybrid threats, 
which can change its security environment.114 Finnish society is more dependent on 
digitalized and automated systems than before, and such systems can be targeted by hybrid 
actions. As The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats highlighted 
in a working paper, “[t]argets of Hybrid influencing have been scattered across the whole 
society, as the Hybrid actors are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities and capability gaps 
existing in our technologically advanced societies.”115 
Finland has dealt with its national security issues quite well. It has developed its 
national security strategy to use a wide range of national capabilities under different kind 
of organizations and ministries. In Finland this strategy is called “The Security Strategy for 
Society,” and its main principles are cooperation and coordination through the process of 
preparedness in order to, first, be prepared with planning and action including research and 
training, and second, get feedback from exercises and functions in order to develop the 
process and gain better cooperation.116 
Finland’s Functions Vital for Society (FVS), illustrated in Figure 9, are the basis of 
the preparation actions in society. These actions need cooperation between different 
authorities and ministries. Leadership covers all capable management actions needed to 
keep effective processes ongoing, and it requires clear roles and decisive actions between 
different authorities, situational awareness, information management, and the ability to 
cooperate. International and EU Activities are an integral part of the safety and security 
planning processes and are linked to every safeguarding activity in the nation. Defence 
                                                 
114 “Hybrid threats are at their very core interlinked, operating in a domain spanning activities that the 
threat actors, nation states or non-state actors, conduct in order to advance their agenda and attain their 
goals.” Cederberg et al., Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts, 2. 
115 Cederberg et al., Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts, 3. 
116 The Council of State, The Security Strategy for Society of Finland, Government Resolution 
November 2, 2017 (Finland: The Security Committee, 2017), 9, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/security-
strategy-for-society. 
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Capabilities focus on developing and maintaining the pre-emptive threshold that an 
adversary would need to cross in order to use force against Finland (see further information 
in Appendix E, The Finnish Defence Forces tasks and Readiness structure). The defence 
capabilities are part of the society and other vital functions, because the main forces are 
based on reserves who are part of the civilian sector. By maintaining Internal Security, the 
society will prevent crimes against its population and humanity, and sustain the structures 
necessary to manage consequences of natural disasters and damage. Economy, 
Infrastructure, and Security of Supplies must be maintained during a crisis in order to 
secure society’s vital functions and survival. Functional Capacity of the Population and 
Services aims to support the population’s ability to function and stay well by maintaining 
core services. Psychological Resilience is meant to prepare individuals, communities, and 
society to withstand the mental pressure caused by crisis situations and to cope with their 
effects during the Pre-Crisis, Crisis, and Recovery times. The key to the effective measures 
is the population’s trust in the government’s ability to keep all of these structures 
functioning and to give hope to the people.117     
 
Figure 9.  The Functions Vital for Society in Finland.118 
                                                 
117 The Council of State, The Security Strategy for Society of Finland, 14–24. 
118 The Council of State, The Security Strategy for Society of Finland, 14. 
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The FVS model can serve as an effective tool against Russian hybrid warfare, 
requiring the people’s cooperation, working with each other, inside this model. First, the 
coordination and cooperation between different authorities and capabilities is important. 
Secondly, the intelligence collection and analysis from each branch has to be coordinated, 
and analysis must be presented together to political leaders so that they can have good 
situational awareness. For example, one of the recently released laws gives authorities 
more tools to monitor and search data from cyberspace.119 Thirdly, international relations 
and work forums have to be healthy; for a small country like Finland, this is the way to be 
a part of world politics. Finally, leaders and capabilities have to create a credible narrative 
with credible security to influence their citizens and, especially, to deter possible 
attackers.120   
The power to carry out the FVS is contained in the Finnish Emergency Power Act 
1552/2011, which has been updated recently to respond to future threats. The main body 
of the law describes the situations when this act can be put into action. The act uses the 
word exceptions to describe situations that could lead to a crisis that would invoke the law: 
• armed or aggressive assault on Finland and its immediate aftermath; 
• the threat of a major armed or severely aggressive attack on Finland, the 
prevention of which requires the immediate introduction of the powers 
conferred under this Act;  
• a particularly serious incident or threat to the population’s livelihood or to 
the economic bases of the country as a result of which essential functions 
of society are substantially jeopardized;  
• a particularly serious major accident and its immediate aftermath;  
                                                 
119 Rosendahl Jussi, “Finland Aims to Fast-Track New Intelligence Laws to Avert Terrorism,” Reuters, 
April 19, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-security/finland-aims-to-fast-track-new-
intelligence-laws-to-avert-terrorism-idUSKBN17L213. 
120 The Council of State, The Security Strategy for Society of Finland, 33–35. 
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• a very widespread dangerous infectious disease, which is particularly 
serious for major accidents.121    
All of these situations can be used as tools in a larger hybrid operation. The tools are called 
Comprehensive Security in Finland, and the defense-related part of it is the Comprehensive 
National Defence.122 
  
                                                 
121 Emergency power Act, 1552, §3, (December 29, 2011), 
https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2011/20111552?search%5Btype%5D=pika&search%5Bpika%5D=val
miuslaki, emphasis added. 
122  The Council of State, The Security Strategy for Society of Finland, 7. See also Michael Aaronson et 
al., who explain that the NATO Comprehensive Approach concept has three themes: “1) coherent 
application of national instruments of power; 2) comprehensive interaction with other actors; and 3) 
comprehensive action in all domains and elements of crises.” Michael Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering 
the Hybrid Threat,” Prism 2, no. 4 (April 2013): 117–118. 
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_2-4/Prism_111-124_Aaronson-Diessen.pdf. 
 46 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 47 
IV. FINLAND’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SCENARIOS 
IN THE BALTIC SEA 
It is not that they can’t see the solution. It is that they can’t see the 
problem. 
—Gilbert K. Chesterton123 
 
This chapter focuses on the main question of this study, which is whether FINSOF 
is flexible enough to cope with both internal and external missions in the face of rising 
hybrid threats from Russia. The chapter uses three hypothetical scenarios focused on the 
northern Europe region and the Baltic Sea, all of which are based on worst-case 
possibilities.  
The three scenarios in this chapter were created by Charly Salonius-Pasternak, 
James Mashiri, and Michael Moberg and first appeared in issue 9/2015 of Suomen 
Kuvalehti, published online February 27, 2015, in an article entitled “Venäjä vaatii 
Suomelta laivastotukikohtaa, Gotlannin Saari miehitetään—voisiko näin tapahtua?”124 It 
was published subsequently online with the headline “What if Russia Demands a Naval 
Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”125 Such scenarios are important tools of 
assessment for every independent state. In my analysis, I begin by describing each scenario; 
then, I describe the readiness of the countries and their willingness to use military power 
in each case. After every scenario, I use SWOT to estimate the roles that FINSOF could 
play in each one. Because we do not know exactly how different countries will develop in 
                                                 
123 Gilbert K. Chesterton, AZQuotes, Wind and Fly LTD, accessed November 12, 2017, 
https://www.azquotes.com/quote/54521. 
124 Charly Salonius-Pasternak, James Mashiri, and Michael Moberg, “Venäjä Vaatii Suomelta 
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125 Charly Salonius-Pasternak, James Mashiri and Michael Moberg, “What if Russia Demands a Naval 




the future, I assume that the strengths and politics of each country depicted in the scenarios 
remains quite the same as they are today. 
In all of these scenarios, the main players are Russia, Finland, Sweden, and NATO. 
126 Russia sees itself as a status quo state in Northern Europe and NATO as a challenger of 
that. Russia feels that NATO is moving too close to its sphere of influence, little by little, 
putting Russia in a situation in which it feels it must act.127 These scenarios are all based 
on this assumption. It should also be noted that Russia has more conventional forces in the 
Baltic Sea region than NATO; furthermore, the geography of the region gives Russia the 
possibility to move toward escalation.128     
Daily life in these scenarios is assumed to be essentially the same as it was in 2017 
after the Russian Zapad2017 exercise. Finland has remained outside of NATO; it is a 
member of the EU, and it has bilateral agreements with neighboring countries such as 
Sweden. The Finnish SOF has strengths and tasks similar to those described in Chapter II. 
All of these scenarios share the assumption that one of the SOF Task Forces, consisting of 
one platoon-size unit, is deployed in the Middle East, , one Task Force is training, and the 
last unit is at partial readiness and leave. Otherwise, the Finnish Defence Forces’ workflow 
remains the same. The Finnish Air Force has its main task to secure Finland’s airspace, and 
the Finnish Navy will do its surveillance tasks in nearby waters with the cooperation of the 
Finnish Border Guard, which is part of the Ministry of Interior.  
These scenarios assume that Russia is at its normal peacetime strength and has not 
called its reservists into action. Furthermore, the scenarios follow the main “movements” 
that Russia rehearsed in its huge exercise Zapad2017. Finally, they assume that Russia’s 
                                                 
126 “The countries in the Nordic region have direct and indirect roles in guaranteeing the security of the 
Baltic States.” Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “The Role of Sweden and Finland in NATO’s Defense of 
the Baltic States,” last modified April 28, 2016, No. 4554, 1–2, https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-
role-sweden-and-finland-natos-defense-the-baltic-states. 
127 Ulrich Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2018), 13, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/preventing-
escalation-in-baltics-nato-playbook-pub-75878. 
128 Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook, 25–26. 
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security considerations have stayed more vital than its economic efforts, and it has 
continued its military modernization programs as planned. 
A. FINLAND’S UNILATERAL OPTION: THE ÅLAND CASE 
The next sub-chapter describes events in the Scenario 1. 
1. Events in Scenario 1 
This first hypothetical scenario is based on the strategic meaning of Åland, a group 
of Finnish islands situated between Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea. It is a 
demilitarized zone based on an agreement of the League of Nations from the year 1921.129 
The very first situation goes like this:  
A month ago an oil tanker with a full cargo was captured in the Baltic 
Sea. Two weeks later Russia announced that there had been an attempt 
at sabotage on the Nordstream undersea gas pipe 40 kilometers south of 
Helsinki. Only a faulty radio-controller unit prevented an explosion and 
catastrophe.130  
As described, the situation will be part of Russia’s hybrid warfare operations, but 
no one knows that yet. Of course, the main international media are interested in this kind 
of situation, and there is much news about the sabotage attempt in the middle of the Baltic 
Sea. The Russians have entered the Escalation stage using both information warfare and 
strategic deterrence measures. This means that Russia had already made preparations with 
covert actions and formations without being discovered by the West (see Figure 10). 
                                                 
129 League of Nations, “Convention Relative a La Non-Fortification et a la Neutralisation Des Iles 
d’Aland,” Treaty No. 255, Geneva, October 20, 1921, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=LON&id=575&chapter=30&clang=_en. 




Figure 10.  Scenario 1: Finland’s unilateral oprtion, the Åland case.131 
The actions were follow through social media:  
Videos from a group called Oil Fighters Front (OFF) have been 
spreading in social media. In those, the reasons for OFF’s strikes against 
Russia’s oil export via the Baltic Sea is given. The leader of the 
organization who calls Åland, Finland, his home has publicly thanked a 
political party that is part of the Finnish government for their support. 
The Finnish prime minister denies any claims of support from the 
Finnish government.132  
                                                 
131 This map is modified by the author from the Finnish Defence Forces added the information from 
the case: Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
132 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
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These actions in the Baltic Sea will raise questions of security in the international 
organizations and countries in the Baltic Sea region. Actions can be described as part of 
the opposition forces in the Gerasimov model (see Figure 11). In Ukraine in 2014, activities 
operating in the so-called gray zone were designed to avoid target detection capabilities, 
which is the same in this case.133 A tracking process of security issues will start among the 
Finnish authorities.  
In this phase, nobody knows what OFF is or where it is from:  
Soon after news emerges that an attempt to capture another oil tanker 
has been made; Russia announces that it will step up patrolling in the 
Gulf of Finland and in the northern Baltic Sea. Despite the increased 
monitoring, an oil tanker that was returning to the Primorski oil port 
without cargo sends a distress signal late at night using international 
emergency frequencies: there has been a massive explosion below 
decks, and the ship is sinking. The crew is rescued, but the tanker is lost 
about 30 km south of the island of Jurmo. The Russian Baltic Fleet and 
the Western Military District begin a wide-scale readiness exercise the 
very next morning. A full combat unit of marines with all gear from 
vehicles to anti-aircraft missiles is loaded onto ships. On the next 
morning the international media is told of a Russian fisherman who has 
seen sea mines in the northern Baltic Sea. The information is 
corroborated by photos taken by the fisherman. Cargo ships 
immediately begin to change their routes, and by the afternoon all sea 
traffic in the region has ceased—and along with it 90% of Finnish 
imports and exports.134  
The tensions in the Baltic Sea region rise to the next level and at the same time, Russia 
moves its actions to the next phase: Start of the Conflict Actions, with a direct military 
threat supported by economic sanctions and information operations. This time Finland acts 
by sending its military vessel minesweeper Katanpää to the area. One of Finland’s Coast 
                                                 
133 Cederberg et al., Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts, 5. 




Guard vessels in already patrolling near Åland, and perhaps another one is searching for 
the remnants of the lost tanker somewhere near the island of Jurmo.135  
International forums focus on Russia’s reaction, and it makes an 
announcement:  
Russian Federation is now forced to shoulder the main responsibility for 
the security of the Baltic Sea because terrorists supported by western 
governments are trying to destroy Russia by strangling its exports. The 
next morning, the captain of the minesweeper Katanpää receives a 
message directly from the commander of the Russian naval task force. 
It is a complete surprise: Finns are told to remain in the Turku 
archipelago. Russia will take care of identifying and dismantling the 
mines and will hunt for the terrorists. An hour later the intelligence chief 
of the Defence Forces gives his update to the Finnish Foreign and 
Security Policy Committee that includes some ministers and the 
president. The chief of defence suggests enacting certain powers given 
in the emergency powers act and that Finland interprets the 
demilitarization treaty of Åland in a way that allows free access to the 
Defence Forces. The political leadership is not ready to accept the latter 
suggestion. They are afraid that it would send a wrong signal and could 
escalate the situation. On the matter of using emergency powers, the 
assembled ministers cannot agree whether the situation fits criteria for 
emergency conditions set in Chapter 1, Section 2, Paragraph 3, which 
states that emergency conditions include the threat of war [or] other 
specific conditions outside Finland having a comparable effect. 
Nevertheless, the level of readiness is raised for the military.136  
Because Finland has the scalable readiness law, this situation means that some parts of the 
Finnish Defence Forces now call their reservists into action. In the first phase, these 
reservists are normally experts, soldiers from the readiness units or reserve officers to 
                                                 
135 The League of Nations agreement about the Åland allows Finland to take some actions inside the 
demilitarized zone if the situation requires those, as mentioned: “in the event of the neutrality of the zone 
being imperiled by a sudden attack either against the Aaland Islands or across them against the Finnish 
mainland, Finland shall take the necessary measures in the zone to check and repulse the aggressor until 
such time as the High Contracting Parties shall, in conformity with the provisions of the present 
Convention, be in a position to intervene to enforce respect for the neutrality of the islands.” The League of 
Nations, Convention Relative a La Non-Fortification Et a La Neutralisation Des Iles D’Aland, in Article 
10, Geneva, October 20, 1921. 
136 Salonius-Pasternak, Mashiri, and Moberg, “Venäjä Vaatii Suomelta Laivastotukikohtaa. Gotlannin 
Saari Miehitetään. Voisiko Näin Tapahtua?,” 34.  
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support headquarters. Now it is clear that Finland is confronting a situation that can lead to 
escalation toward a larger crisis.  
However, the mysterious Oil Fighter Front remains unknown, and its acting against 
Russian tankers seems odd. What if the OFF is part of the larger operative plan from 
Russia? The very next day, Russia takes action in the Baltic Sea:  
The main news in all countries around the Baltic Sea is about a new 
video that the Oil Fighters Front has published online. It says that the 
group will also use aircraft and submarines against Russia’s oil exports. 
In the background of the video, there is a glimpse of the Åland islands. 
Russia immediately announces a no-flight zone up to 10 km that will be 
enforced from the sea and air. The Finnish military intelligence is 
informed by Sweden that the components of the [Russian] division 
ordered to participate in the readiness exercise are still in their ready 
positions in Kaliningrad. The Finnish Navy is then informed that three 
Ropucha-class landing vessels are moving to the sea.137  
Because of its good relationships with Sweden and other Baltic states, Finland will get 
quite good information about Russian movements through military intelligence 
cooperation. If the Russian fleet moves out from Kaliningrad, its movements will always 
be of interest to several other countries and NATO. The intelligence community supports 
the situational awareness in Finland, and finally, the best estimate comes from one of the 
Swedish submarines that have followed the Russians. The captain assesses that:  
[t]he ships are filled to capacity with equipment and troops. After that, 
a brief telephone conversation between the Finnish and Swedish Chiefs 
of Operation confirms one thing: Russia has with its readiness exercise 
created the ability to conduct amphibious and airborne assaults 
anywhere in the Baltic Sea region within 24 hours.138  
If Russia decides to invade Åland with amphibian units, there will be no time to get to the 
island with conventional units.  
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Island?” An emphasis added. 




Even though Finnish military intelligence has presented alarming 
assessments for a long time, the political leadership has not dared to 
decide upon even a partial mobilization; only a few reservists have been 
called to the service. Because of these delays only the Air Force, some 
units from Finnish Navy have the immediate capability to defend the 
integrity of Finland’s territory.139  
The upcoming threat from Russia puts the politicians into a difficult situation. If they 
authorize a partial mobilization, that could be a signal to Russia that Finland is ready for 
military conflict. Yet, if the politicians do nothing, it could be a signal that Russia can go 
farther in its demands without consequences. Russia will not be afraid of NATO 
intervention this time because Finland is not a part of NATO with its Article 5 security 
guarantee. Regardless, the next offer to the Finnish politicians comes from Sweden; it has 
had an amphibious battalion available for two days.  
After a quickly called meeting of the Swedish government, they offer 
the battalion to the defence of Finland. The offer comes as a shock to 
the Finnish political leadership and Finland thanks Sweden for the offer 
but is not ready to accept it, yet.  When the Foreign and Security Policy 
Committee adjourns, the prime minister is given another urgent 
message. Its main point is that Russia does not foresee improvement in 
the security of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Therefore, it 
would be important that it would be given a base from where it could 
fight against the terrorists. Russia suggests a joint base with Finland and 
Sweden. The military port in Upinniemi or the Hanko port are presented 
as good choices. The message ends with a statement that Russia wishes 
for cooperation but is prepared to take independent actions to secure a 
base for the operations. The Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 
Committee is immediately reconvened.140  
2. Russian Hybrid Warfare in Scenario 1 
The politicians in Finland had not realized how dangerous the situation in scenario 1 was. 
In this case, by rejecting help from Sweden, they have put Finland in a situation where it 
must respond by itself. Now, the political options are either to respond to the threat and 
                                                 
139 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?”  
140 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
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move toward the crisis alone, or to accept the demands from the Russian side and see what 
will happen.  
The Russians’ use of hybrid warfare has led to the situation they wanted in this 
scenario. Finland is alone against Russia. Russia has used hybrid warfare to implement its 
actions against Finland according to a rapid timetable, and the phases of escalation can be 
seen clearly. In this case, Russia does not have to use all its capabilities from the model; it 
has picked the ones most suitable for this kind of operation. Russian actions in scenario 1 
are indicated with red arrows and numbers in Figure 11, which shows that Russia is ready 
to start the fourth phase, the Crisis phase. In this case, it means that opposing forces and 
authorities should be ready before phase 4 is reached. 
 
Figure 11.  Russian actions in Scenario 1: Finland’s unilateral option.141 
                                                 
141 Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.” Additional information has been 
added by the author. 
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3. Implications to FINSOF 
In this kind of scenario, the FINSOF offer capabilities Finland can use. On a tactical 
level, they already have the organization and structure to respond rapidly. FINSOF has a 
“crisis-ready” culture inside its structures and leadership, and the culture of challenging the 
optimism and credulity in this kind of situation to be prepared.142 Being prepared means 
having suitable overall plans against certain kinds of scenarios, available command and 
control structures, available communication lines and structures, and clear knowledge of 
responsibilities with regard to who is doing what with which responsibility.  
FINSOF’s use in scenario 1 can be described by viability level. In this case, viability 
means that FINSOF has a chance of success and the capacity to operate in the situation 
described in scenario 1. If the total Viability score is less than zero, FINSOF is not viable 
for use in this scenario.  A total Viability score of zero means that FINSOF’s viability must 
be evaluated based on the particular situation.  A total Viability score of +1 indicates that 
FINSOF can be used in this scenario, and a total Viability score great than +1 indicates that 
FINSOF can be strongly viable in this scenario (see Table 2).  
  
                                                 
142 Tim Johnson, Crisis Leadership: How to Lead in Times of Crisis, Threat and Uncertainty (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2018), 19. 
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Table 2.   FINSOF Viability in Scenario 1. 
 
 
By comparing Gerasimov model phases (see Figure 11) to the model of Figure 12, 
Basic layer to scenario build-up process based on the NATO Spectrum of Conflict, we can 
see that the main courses of action happen during the two phases of Pre-crisis and 
Escalation. Asymmetrical warfighting with specialized skill units and SOF brings this 
threat to the area called the gray zone. This gray-zone period is challenging because no 
clear indicators signal that the nation is in crisis, but some actions are ongoing that will 
affect the nation’s capabilities and survival. Also, it is difficult for a defender that requires 
legislative action to use its military. Unlike the United States, Finland has no doctrine 
regarding the use of general-purpose forces for conventional war and SOF for irregular 
war.143 That is why the FINSOF structure needs to be flexible enough to respond to 
                                                 
143 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military 
Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2016), 5. 
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situations like this, and decisions need to be made quickly to raise readiness and capabilities 
to be ready to respond if needed.  
 
Figure 12.  Basic layer to scenario build-up process on the NATO 
Spectrum of Conflict. Emphasis added from Scenario 1.144  
Clearly, the time to act with SOF in Scenario 1 is immediately after the first strike 
against the oil tanker and activation of the OFF. That strike can be seen as a terrorist act 
and responsibility for counterterrorism is in the Ministry of Interior. Because the conditions 
are in a difficult operating environment, the Ministry of Interior in Finland will need 
support from the Finnish Defence Forces, especially for transporting equipment by air and 
sea. This kind of situation near Finnish coastal borders should activate both situational 
awareness processes and the execution process of the special operations against possible 
terrorist networks. The structure needs to be immediately Joint and comprehensive because 
SOF need support from every service and all actors to conduct possible operations against 
the enemy in this case.   
                                                 
144 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–3. 
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Because the main scenario happens in the Åland area, Finland needs to think how 
to manage its operations in the demilitarized zone. The answer is to use forces from the 
Ministry of Interior, supported in this particular case with equipment and supplies from the 
Finnish Defence Forces.145 In this particular scenario the Finnish Defence Forces SOF can 
be used as a reserve and be prepared to enter optional targets outside of the demilitarized 
zone. The lack of manpower can be repaired with reservists if there are suitable structures 
and methods to do so quickly. In this specific case, the needed reservists would be the most 
valuable inside the commanding structures and the Finnish Border Guard SOF units.  
In Finland, SOF never talked before clandestine operations,146 but in this case, SOF 
need to do some preparations in the target area before the rest of the troops will arrive. 
Ministry of Interior FINSOF could conduct environmental reconnaissance to prepare the 
battlefield, create networks among the local people, support evacuation plans, and create 
resistance cells. This work can fit the MA criteria and the main work on the scene will be 
to advise and assist. Nevertheless, the situation affects the FINSOF tasks and operation, 
and they need to prepare to do full the spectrum of SOF tasks if necessary.   
A quick reaction can show the adversary that the nation is willing to respond to the 
threat, and its immediate actions can deter the enemy and make it withdraw from its 
intentions. As Antonio J. Echevarria has written about nations’ coercion-deterrence 
operations, actions can be non-kinetic and kinetic, with capacities including military, 
diplomatic, informational, and economic measures. In this case, the SOF actions can be 
part of the Finnish political and informational countermeasures against the adversary.147 I 
analyzed the FINSOF performance in scenario 1 with SWOT (shown in Table 3). 
                                                 
145 The Prime Minister’s Office guide says that it is mandatory for Åland to plan their actions before and 
during the crisis time. Prime Minister’s Office, “Ohje Valmiuslain mukaisten toimivaltuuksien 
käyttöönottamisesta -päätöksentekomenettely Valtioneuvosteossa”, Appendix to VNK/939/61/2016, June 6, 
2017, 9, https://api.hankeikkuna.fi/asiakirjat/d78f3b37-f964-435e-809f-a303651184d6/eeb7f704-bffe-4d5b-
ba1f-f8b4bcbbb644/ASETTAMISPAATOS_20171212065000.PDF. 
146 According to Joint Publication 3–05, a clandestine operation is “an operation sponsored or 
conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such way as to assure secrecy or concealment.” 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Special Operations, JP 3–05 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), GL-7, 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05.pdf. 
147 Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy, 26. 
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Table 3.   SWOT with FINSOF in scenario 1: Finland’s unilateral option. 
 
 
It is important to note, however, that transportation to the operational area needs to 
be fixed. First, the one Finnish SOF task force that is abroad must return to the homeland, 
especially if this crisis will continue. In this case, there can be a situation in which 
manpower can be delivered but their equipment will be delayed.148 Secondly, the 
cooperation between SOF units and civilian authorities and the local population needs to 
be activated before using transportation of equipment and possible troops to the target 
                                                 
148 Finland is a part of the NATO Strategic Airlift Capacity Program, but it can use only 3.2 percent of 
the capacity. This means that planes can be used only a few times a year and these flights must be booked 




areas. Thirdly, all actions need to be conducted under great secrecy and operational 
security, and this might need a high level of deceptive actions. These movements need to 
be planned with great care, and the time to conduct infiltrations to the Åland Islands must 
be used wisely because of the threat of the Russian forces.149  
B. FINLAND’S BILATERAL OPTION: THE GOTLAND CASE 
The next sub-chapter describes events in the Scenario 2. 
1. Events in Scenario 2 
The following scenario is based on another island situated in the middle of the 
Baltic Sea, Gotland. This island has the same kind of the strategic meaning to Sweden that 
Åland has to Finland. In this scenario tensions in the Baltic Sea have already risen because 
of Russia’s exercises in the southern Baltic Sea (see Figure 13). It means that Russia has 
already taken the steps to escalate the crisis. From Finland’s point of view, this scenario 
begins in the Pre-crisis phase and inside the so-called gray zone. 
                                                 
149 NATO AJP-3.5 highlights the infiltration as: “a technique and process in which a force moves as 
individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection.” NATO, Allied 
Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5, LEX-4. 
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Figure 13.  Scenario 2: Finland’s bilateral option, the Gotland case.150 
The scenario starts with tensions situated in the Baltic Sea area as follows: “for 
Sweden and NATO countries only a few diplomatic connections remain with Russia. 
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have partial mobilization in place, and the state of 
readiness has been raised for NATO’s new vanguard troops.”151 The assumption is that 
tensions in the Baltic Sea area have raised military readiness to its highest levels in many 
countries because of Russia’s exercises. These actions have not gone unnoticed in Finland.  
 
                                                 
150 This map, modified by the author, is from the Finnish Defence Forces, with added information from 
the case: Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
151 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland Or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
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The Russian troops in Kaliningrad are in a state of constant readiness, 
and they have had three readiness exercises within the last month. The 
battalion commander of Hemvärnet (national guard) of Gotland is 
kidnapped. This news has barely reached Swedish media when another 
news story breaks: the army storage buildings in Gotland have caught 
fire. The depot on fire is where all 14 tanks on the island are stored. A 
new entity called the Gotlands folkrepublik (Gotland’s People’s 
Republic) makes its first appearance on the Internet. Their official pages 
state that the republic has been formed because Sweden has not been 
willing to defend the island nor utilize the shale gas deposits in the close 
proximity to benefit the Islanders. Now Gotlanders are seizing the 
responsibility for their resources, economy, and government.152 
According to Gerasimov model, Russian forces started the Escalation phase using 
criminals, opposition groups, or their special forces to cause disorder and uncertainty, 
similar to the tactics Russia used in the Donbass area in 2014.153 Russia moved rapidly 
through Escalation to the next phase, initiating Conflict activities. Its forces conduct covert 
asymmetrical actions against their targets, and use non-military means in support of active 
information operations to achieve strategic goals.154  
Years ago these types of actions were conducted mainly by the KGB, and the role 
of the Russian SOF was mainly to support Soviet Army intelligence and sabotage. Overall, 
the Russian SOF (Spetsnaz) proved its worth as a strategic tool, particularly during Russia’s 
2014 Crimean operation.155  
                                                 
152 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
153 Paul Robinson, “Russia’s Role in the War in Donbass, and the Threat to European Security,” 
European Politics and Society 17, no. 4 (March 15, 2016): 511–514, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1154229. He mentioned that “The transfer of Russian “volunteers” 
onto Ukrainian territory has in part been organized with the direct participation of the Russian authorities.” 
154 Mark Galeotti and Johnny Schumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, ed. Martin Windrow 
(Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2015), 50. 
155 USASOC, Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 
2013–2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2015), 43–46. This report defines 
Spetsnaz as follows, “Russian SPETSNAZ are irregular forces that operate covertly, providing the Russian 
government plausible deniability. They are found throughout the military, intelligence, and security 
services. The SPETSNAZ-GRU (military intelligence) featured prominently in the annexation of Crimea.” 
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The next event, which occurs near the Swedish coast, endangers all Western 
countries in the Baltic Sea area.   
A Swedish JAS Gripen fighter is shot down with shoulder-launched 
surface-to-air missiles. Russia announces that despite the increased 
tensions it will go on with its Zapad18 exercise. A large part of Russia’s 
Baltic Sea navy is on its way from St. Petersburg along the Gulf of 
Finland, with the intention of passing Gotland. Russia begins another 
large-scale readiness exercise that involves the entire western military 
district.156 
Now it is obvious that Russia has started its military activities against a sovereign state and 
has entered a new phase of its operation. Besides shooting down the Swedish fighter, it 
uses military exercises to deter other Western countries and NATO. In this particular 
scenario NATO decides to stay out of this crisis because Sweden is not a NATO member. 
NATO focuses more on the Baltic security situation and it has a lot of work with that, 
though it will monitor and conduct surveillance actions on the Baltic Sea. The United States 
also leaves the Nordic countries alone with their problems in this case. The only effort from 
the U.S. side is to increase economic sanctions against Russia.157   
The Swedish government is having a crisis meeting when three large car 
bombs go off: one in Stockholm, another in Malmö and the third in 
Göteborg. SIA, Svenka Islamistiska Arméen (Swedish Islamic Army), 
an organization that Swedish Security Service Säpo (Säkerthetspolisen) 
has never heard of claims responsibility for the strikes. Svenska 
Islamistika Arméen says that the bombs are the beginning of a fight 
against the Swedish Armed Forces; this includes strikes against 
reservists. Chaos spread rapidly; stores are emptied, and cash runs out 
of ATMs. The next morning helicopters of an airborne landing battalion 
appear above Gotland; they are from a Russian Vladivostok class vessel. 
                                                 
156 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?”  
157 Ukraine was a good partner with the United States before Russia’s invasion of its soil. The United 
States, however, did not give military forces as assisting troops to Ukraine in 2014. The main efforts from 
the U.S. side were driven with three vectors: 1) support Ukraine by means other than military, 2) reassure 
NATO allies, and 3) penalize Russia (with sanctions). Steven Pifer, “Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. Policy 




Heavy Ropucha -class landing vessels bring additional troops to the 
shores carrying both S-400 and Pantsir S-1 anti-aircraft systems.158  
As a part of hybrid warfare, Russia uses its forces from the Baltic fleet with other 
capabilities to seize Gotland. Using S-400 systems,159 they block also airspace on the Baltic 
Sea and southern area of Sweden. These actions also affect Finland’s shipping and flight 
lines, and the conflict immediately affects the Finnish economy. Although there may be 
some debate about whether Sweden and Finland do have a bilateral agreement,160 this 
bilateral agreement requires them to aid each other militarily in the event of an attack. 
Furthermore, Finland is obligated to supply this military assistance if Sweden requests it. 
In addition to its agreements with Finland, Sweden is a member of the EU, which entitles 
Sweden to certain types of support. For example, according to the Solidarity Clause in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, if an EU member state is attacked by terrorists, that state can request aid 
from other EU states.161   
Due to the heavy enemy force, Sweden is only able to partially repel the landing 
party. “The formidable vessel-borne anti-aircraft capability parked between the Swedish 
mainland and Gotland limits the operations of the Swedish Air Force. Gripen fighters and 
the navy’s HMS Visby and HMS Karlstad, however, succeed in sinking the landing vessel 
Ivan Gren and the destroyer Nastoychivyy.”162 
Sweden finds out that it is inside a full-scale crisis with Russia. The ongoing crisis 
reveals several problems with the logistics systems that are designed for smaller-scale 
international operations. “The logistic systems are not suited to handle the demands of the 
                                                 
158 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?.” 
159 “Russia: S-400 Triumph” Jane’s by IHS Markit, August 23, 2018, 
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jlad0593-jaad. The missile can reach air targets up to 250 km but newer 
version of the missile can reach 400 km range. 
160 Government Offices of Sweden, “International Cooperation.” 
161 “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union,” European Union, Pub. L. TITLE VII, Article C 222 (2016), eur-lex.europa.eu. 




needed Swedish Air Force activity. There are enough aircraft but not enough mechanics 
nor pilots to keep them in the air around the clock. Russia announces that it will stop its 
use of force if the Swedish Navy with its submarines withdraws to its ports.”163 
The Finnish government is surprised by the quick escalation of the crisis. The 
Russian information operation has blinded the whole of Western Europe without showing 
its true intentions. The tensions in the Baltic Sea should have already raised readiness in 
Finland at all levels as the comprehensive approach requires.  
The rapid military escalation catches Finland’s political leadership by 
complete surprise. Emergency powers have not been authorized, but the 
Defence Forces are in the highest state of readiness that is possible 
without enactment of the laws. The President has unofficially suggested 
that Finland should offer military support to Sweden. The Finnish 
government has not responded to the suggestion. By the evening news, 
the government announces that Finland will enact certain parts of the 
emergency powers act and will concentrate defence capabilities 
around Åland.164 
One lesson learned from this situation is that situational awareness needs to be kept high 
in the political sphere as well as in the military sphere, within the domestic intelligence 
system and with cooperation international intelligence and information systems. 
The FDF readiness troops react quickly, and the Finnish Navy troops from Finland’s 
coastal brigade (Nyland Brigade) respond to the threat.  
Soon after the act, the Nyland brigade sends a company of volunteer 
coastal rangers towards Åland. The conscripts that had nearly 
completed their service were officially released from their remaining 
duties, enabling them to volunteer immediately. The transport ships are 
guarded by a navy vessel and a flight of F-18 Hornet fighters. One hour 
after the announcement, a deserted Finnish highway acts as a runway 
for six arriving [Swedish] JAS Gripen fighters. They are met by a group 
of Finnish aircraft mechanics who have received training on servicing 
                                                 
163 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 




Gripens. The Swedish mechanics are on a private plane flying towards 
the closest Finnish civilian airport.165 
Next the Finnish located a massive, low-flying squadron that seems to 
indicate a formidable bombing strike is being prepared. F-18 Hornets 
are sent to make identification flights in preparation for Swedish 
Gripens to strike above the Gulf of Finland. Ballistic missile tracking 
systems operated by the United States and NATO detect eight Iskander 
missiles being fired. The information reaches Swedish operational 
headquarters near Stockholm only minutes before the first missile 
strikes the main building. The Swedish air force battle headquarters, 
StriC Grizzly, and military signals intelligence (FRA) centers are also 
struck by the ballistic missiles.166 
In this case, Finland chooses its side very clearly; military cooperation between the 
two countries can be seen as a pact and Russia knows this. Open actions can deter Russia 
because it knows that its support bases are located nearby Finland’s borders and within 
striking distance. On the other hand, Finland needs to monitor carefully what is happening 
in other areas near Finland’s borders. If Finland decides to help Sweden with SOF 
capabilities, it might leave a security gap in Finland. The situation gets worse by the next 
morning:  
Russia’s S-400 antiaircraft systems in Gotland are positioned in a way 
that flying anywhere over the Baltic Sea is very risky. The United States 
could take out the S-400’s, but for now, it is only observing and waiting. 
The Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Committee is facing its 
greatest dilemma to date. The government is split between two choices. 
Some are in favor of complete and open military support for Sweden, in 
effect a full joint defence. Russia would surely react to that. However, 
Russia knows that Finland is capable of striking strategic targets and 
neutralizing its activity around the Gulf of Finland, for example, by 
striking Luga from where the Iskander missiles were launched. On the 
other hand, some believe that Russia does not yet see Finland as being 
an open party to the conflict. Could Finland be the peace maker?167 
                                                 
165 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
166 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
167 Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish 
Island?” 
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2. Russian Hybrid Warfare in Scenario 2 
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the scenario in which Finland is drawn into the crisis 
with Sweden. Russian aggression surprises all in the Baltic areas and international forums, 
and the United States seems to have no will to react quickly to regional conflict. We can 
say that the basic layer of the graphic in Figure 14 is based on the main principles described 
in a USASOC report: “use of proxies, denial to deflect international criticism and domestic 
political reaction, information and cyberwarfare, and political preparation of 
populations.”168  
Russian actions in Scenario 2 are indicated with red arrow and numbers in Figure 
14, which shows that Russia is already in the Escalation phase when the situation in this 
scenario begins. Scenario 2 ends in the Crisis phase with military conflict and Russian 
military presence on Sweden’s soil. The scenario seems to show that Russia has completed 
its military goals, taking the Gotland Islands. This move takes Russia closer to the next 
phase; that is, the Resolution phase. 
                                                 





Figure 14.  Russian actions in Scenario 2: Finland’s bilateral option.169 
3. Implications to FINSOF 
It is obvious that the situation starts rapidly but the first indicators should alert decision 
makers in Sweden and Finland. If Russia uses the same model as before, the indicators can be 
found in the overlay of the Russian mist created by Maskirovka. Finding the indicators requires 
a continuing analysis process and situational awareness from the states. The importance of the 
intelligence community, intelligence cooperation, and precise reports and analysis to the 
nations’ leaders is high. In this case, Gerasimov model is very true: “military actions start by 
groups of troops during peace-time, war is not declared at all.”170  
 
 
                                                 
169 Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.” Additional information added 
by the author. 
170 Gyllensporre, “Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations Theory,” 30. 
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In scenario 2, the FINSOF viability level raises the high likelihood that FINSOF 
will be used to help Sweden’s SOF if needed. The score indicates that FINSOF can be 
strongly viable in this scenario (see Table 4).  
Table 4.   FINSOF Viability in Scenario 2. 
Item Points  Explanations 
Support from outside: NATO 
and bilateral. 
+1  FINSOF get support from Sweden bilaterally when it is 
willing to help Sweden, and that move pits Finland against 
Russia. 
FINSOF can act directly against 
adversary. 
0 FINSOF has limited capability to act directly against 
adversary in Sweden, but it is a possibility. 
FINSOF can act indirectly 
against adversary. 
+1 FINSOF has the capability to act against adversary 
indirectly, for example, through Information operations. 
FINSOF can do the task without 
large-scale mobilization. 
0 FINSOF can act in Sweden with peacetime strength, but will 
need reservists and abroad units to prepare for possible 
upcoming crisis in homeland. 
FINSOF Strategic level 
Command and Control effect. 
- 1 FINSOF’s lack of Strategic level Command and Control 
mechanism hampers the interoperability and cooperation. 
FINSOF Intelligence support. + 1 Sweden provides intel support in this case. 
FINSOF Aviation support.  0 FINSOF’s lack of Strategic airlift and SOF aviation can be 
problematic if Sweden’s own capability is in use all the time. 
Total FINSOF Viability in 
operations in Scenario 2 during 
gray-zone period. 








FINSOF’s task force can be used in this situation to help Sweden. FINSOF’s 
flexibility allows these troops to custom-tailor tasks for rapidly deployed teams with pre-
plans or with mission and situation-related plans.171 Deployment as a response force 
requires situational awareness, which has to be coordinated with Swedish intelligence. 
Using SOF also indicates to Russia that Finland is ready to act to support Sweden according 
to the agreements between the two countries. Finland can transfer, for example, the 
SOTF situated in the Middle-East to Sweden (see Figure 15). Using SOF also creates 
deterrence against Russia and compels Russia to prepare counter-strikes against targets on 
its own soil. 
   
Figure 15.  Basic layer to scenario build-up process on the NATO 
Spectrum of Conflict. Emphasis added from Scenario 2.172 
 
                                                 
171 Horn, “Operationalizing SOF Theory: A Function of Understanding SOF Power,” 65. 
172 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–3. 
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Finland’s decision makers are buying time to answer the attacker’s operations by 
supporting Sweden. Even more important, effecting surprise may impact the minds of the 
attacker’s leaders, creating friction within its activities in the operational area.173 The 
element of surprise is one of the basic principles for use of SOF.  
Assisting a foreign country with forces needs prior planning, cooperation, 
rehearsals, and interoperability. The speed at which the crisis developed in this scenario 
surprised the decision makers. From FINSOF’s point of view, there was no time left to do 
large rehearsals with accompanying forces after the decision to support Sweden. One 
lesson learned concerns readiness, which places demands on troops (including military, 
agencies, and troops from other Ministries) but also on structures and networks with 
international partnerships. Exercises with these partnership countries need to be added at 
every level, according to the strategic level. Exercises and operations together are the only 
way to get familiar with each nations’ tactical principles and learn how to solve the crisis 
or situations that need support with other countries’ forces. 
 Another big lesson learned from this scenario is that other nations can be in a crisis 
situation while the supporting country is still at the pre-crisis phase. From FINSOF’s point 
of view, this means that it is not necessary to have any reservists or wartime structures 
available when the operation in Sweden starts. An analysis of FINSOF’s performance from 







                                                 
173 Jan Hanska, “Times of War and War over Time” (PhD diss, Military Sciences Dept., The National 
Defence University, Helsinki, 2017), 251, http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2881-3. 
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Table 5.   SWOT with FINSOF in scenario 2: Finland’s bilateral option. 
 
 
Scenario 2 does not tell us which kind of warfare the Swedish forces will launch 
against the attacker in Gotland. Because the adversary is stronger, we can assume that a 
smaller state will use an indirect approach against the attacker. In this case, for example, 
the indirect approach can mean an irregular warfare type of resistance on the island.174 
FINSOF capabilities in MA or SR can be used in this kind of warfare if necessary, but local 
                                                 
174 Irregular warfare can be defined as MMI states: “the overarching method used in an indirect 
strategy in order to win the war by other means than conventional warfare.” MMI, “Irregular Warfare - A 
Strategy for Small States,” in Special Operations in Small State Perspective, eds. Gunilla Eriksson and 
Ulrica Pettersson (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 146. 
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knowledge and support from the local population are required.175 Besides MA and SR, 
FINSOF can also support Sweden with available counterterrorism, SOF Air, and SOF 
Maritime capabilities.   
Insertion and extraction of forces in this scenario need to be done cautiously and 
with high degree of secrecy. Finland must determine whether it wants to reveal to Russia 
every supportive movement it makes toward Sweden? If the answer is yes, then we can act 
openly and use overt operations. If the answer is no, however, then FINSOF will need to 
act as a covert force.176 Covert operation can require a different kind of status for the troops 
inside Swedish boundaries. First, FINSOF troops must be clearly identified, both to 
Swedish forces and also to their own compatriots in order to avoid blue-on-blue 
situations.177 Second, every action needs to be done under high secrecy and control. 
Thirdly, covert operations need clear and precise goals with overall military deception178 
plans, and in this case, with the Swedish planning process.   
C. FINLAND’S MULTILATERAL OPTION AS PART OF A LARGER 
CRISIS: THE NARVA CASE  
The next sub-chapter describes events in the Scenario 3. 
1. Events in Scenario 3 
The following scenario is based on a crisis between Russia and Europe that takes 
place in Estonia and near Finland’s borders, both in the northern Baltic Sea region and near 
                                                 
175 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, Indian edition ed. (New Delhi: Pentagon 
Press, 2012). Liddell Hart speaks about unification and meaning of the balance on the ground, 366–372. 
176 Covert operation is “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or 
permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Special Operations, GL-7. 
177 During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan coalition forces hit each other a couple of times causing 
unacceptable losses with friendly fire. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Blue on Blue Deaths Raises Tough 
Questions for MoD,” The Guardian, last modified Aug 24, 2007, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/25/military.iraq. 
178 Military deception is defined in the United States as “actions executed to deliberately mislead 
adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the 
adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly 
mission.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2018), 152, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/dictionary.pdf. 
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Arctic waters. The actions for this scenario can be found in Figure 16. As Ulrich Kuhn has 
written in the NATO playbook: “The regional imbalance between NATO’s and Russia’s 
conventional forces, NATO’s own deterrence loopholes, and the geography of the Baltics 
all make both deliberate and inadvertent escalation possible.” In this scenario, the 
escalation leads to a bigger crisis involving several countries and NATO.179   
 
Figure 16.  Scenario 3: Finland’s multilateral option, the Narva case.180 
Since the Crimea and Ukraine events, the gap between Russia and the West has 
deepened, and in this scenario, Escalation turns to crisis and it starts inside Estonia. 
In Narva, Estonia, various non-governmental organizations have 
emerged, all united in their demands that all rights belonging to citizens 
should also be granted to minorities. The alternative the NGOs present 
is Narva’s separation from Estonia and joining with Russia. Estonia has 
raised the readiness of its armed forces and has organized [Joint] 
exercises for different governmental branches in eastern Estonia (Ida-
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Viru). Two weeks ago there was an incident near Narva: three men and 
one woman were killed, and two people were wounded by shots fired 
by the Kaitseliit (national guard). According to Russia, three of the 
killed were Russian citizens living in Estonia. Estonian sources state 
that a Kaitseliit patrol was suddenly fired upon while conducting a drill, 
the schedule of which was public knowledge.181 
One of the main issues in the Baltic States is the presence of ethnic Russians, and 
Russia has announced several times that it has the mission to protect all Russian citizens, 
whether at home or abroad. In Estonia the Russian-speaking population is nearly 25 percent 
(in Narva almost 95 percent), and Russia can use this population both as a justification for 
taking actions to “protect” these people, and as a coercive tool against the Estonian 
government.182  
There have been numerous reports in the Baltic Sea region of Russian behavior 
violating airspace.183 In most of the cases, jet fighters from NATO, Finland, or Sweden fly 
close to these violators to force them to turn back into international airspace. The behavior 
and aim of these Russian pilots is to test readiness and show their military power. These 
tactics can be called risky, and could lead to accidental escalation. To prevent this kind of 
risky behavior, the communication relations with Russia are important.184 In this scenario, 
communication with Russia fails and one event leads to the next one. 
Russia is appealing to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the EU so that the rights of the citizens of Russia 
and of the Russian ethnic minority are secured. Demonstrations in 
Narva, as well as many in social media, are promoting the benefits of 
separation from Estonia. Earlier demands for civil rights have morphed 
into accusations of government officials’ systematic control efforts and 
arrests among the Russian population. At the same time, Russia is 
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182 Henrik Praks, “Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Russia’s Ways of Warfare in the Baltics - 
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184 Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook, 38–39. 
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publishing on its government-controlled media stories saying that 
“Lithuanian, Latvian and Polish fascists” have been recruited to 
strengthen Estonian defence forces. According to the media stories, 
these units are already operating with NATO special forces in Ida-
Viru.185 
Russia’s ongoing information campaign strenghtens its narrative that the Russian 
population needs to be supported abroad. This narrative based on Russian strategy was put 
forth by the Russian government in 2015. This information campaign is a part of Russia’s 
doctrine against NATO and strenghtens the support of its own population against 
NATO.186 Russia using its proxies wanted to spread more chaos in the border areas 
organizes demonstrations in Narva. Because of the tensions of the area these 
demonstrations turned into riots, as Russia calculated. The main goal could be developing 
an apparently inadvertent event that could lead to escalation and then to crisis.187  
The situation becomes extremely tense when the local police chief is 
kidnapped and an officer of the Estonian armed forces is publicly 
executed. Two days later the main government buildings in Narva are 
in the control of armed men who call themselves Narva’s self-defense 
troops (Narva enesekaitsevägi). Their commander announces that they 
will not allow any aircraft into the area, to protect civilians from the 
terrorism of the Estonian fascist military. The Latvian and Lithuanian 
governments call emergency meetings when news of the no-flight zone 
are carried by the media. That afternoon Finnish news broadcast that 
both Latvia and Lithuania have started mobilizing.188 
Russia’s actions resemble those from the 2007 Estonian Bronze-statue riots that 
accompanied a large information campaign and cyber-attacks. In 2007, moving the Soviet 
era monument commemorating the defeat of Nazis as a remainder of Soviet occupation 
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caused violence between the Russian-speaking population and Estonians.189 The Bronze-
statue riots soon turned into vandalism and looting in Estonia, and the situation took a 
dangerous direction when it was obvious that Russia was behind the operation.190  
Activities near the Finnish borders and military mobilizing in several Baltic States 
should activate the readiness processes in Finland191 as follows: 
The Finnish defence minister announces later that evening that even 
though the Finnish Defence Forces have raised their level of readiness, 
there are no other measures being taken due to the situation in the 
Baltics. Finland is not considering offering support to the Baltic 
countries, nor have there been any official requests to do so. Estonia 
demands consultations under the fourth article of the Washington 
Treaty, and NATO ambassadors in Brussels are called together. Estonia 
is also facing broad-scale attacks on its information and electric 
networks, causing Estonia to consider the call for the activation of 
article 5 collective defence. Also, Sweden suggested to Finland two 
days ago, that they could step up monitoring in the Baltic Sea and as 
part of an agreement regarding the shared use of the airspace and 
territorial waters. The new Finnish law on Defence Forces and territorial 
monitoring makes this possible as of January 2016.192 
NATO’s ability to send large formations to the Baltic States will take some time. 
Russia can exploit this time to move its troops into better positions, and with these 
movements, it can deter NATO from making quick decisions.193 This means that crises 
have to be faced with the forces that each country already has available. In recent years 
                                                 
189 Martin Ehala, The Bronze Soldier: Identity Threat and Maintenance in Estonia, Journal of Baltic 
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190 See for example: Francis Tapon, “The Bronze Soldier Explains Why Estonia Prepares for A 
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/francistapon/2018/07/07/the-bronze-soldier-statue-in-tallinn-estonia-give-
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NATO has put some efforts into strengthening the cooperation between NATO and non-
NATO members in the Baltic Sea area; one is example is the maritime operational 
cooperation through the treaty organization’s Baltic Maritime Component Command 
(BMCC).194 Perhaps Maritime SOF operations can be coordinated through this forum. 
Finnish leadership was surprised that Sweden made this request 
publicly, and Finland refused almost immediately. The President 
emphasized restraint and keeping channels of communication open. He 
said he would travel to Moscow before the EU emergency 
meeting. After three armored personnel carriers carrying the first group 
of volunteers from Russia crosses the Estonian border, Estonia 
announces that it is under an attack from Russia. The demand for 
collective defence is a bolt of lightning in an otherwise rainy Brussels 
morning. In a separate message, Estonia reminds Finland and Sweden 
of the Lisbon treaty-based responsibility for defence and support about 
all EU countries. It requests armed support from both to repel the attack 
it is facing.195 
Because Finland only accepted this new task to support other countries in 
the summer of 2017, it has no experience with how such support should be 
organized and with which kind of capabilities. Given Sweden and Finland’s 
bilateral agreement, this leaves open the question of whether either country would 
automatically help the other if Swedish or Finnish forces are attacked in Estonia.196 
In this particular case, the situation in Estonia is confusing. Russian-
supported volunteer forces inside Estonia’s borders violated the sovereignty of the 
nation, but is the Estonian situation still an internal problem? Russia’s information 
operation prevents the neighboring countries from understanding what is 
happening. Without “ground truth” from the area, it is difficult for the Finnish 
                                                 
194 Heather A. Conley, Jeffrey Rathke, and Matthew Melino, Enhanced Deterrence in the North: A 
21st Century European Engagement Strategy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 38, 
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Island?.” 
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government to decide on sending military formations across the Gulf of Finland. 
Instead of sending FDF, Finland can send a small number of SOF. Within this small 
footprint, perhaps drawn from the Border Guard’s SOF unit, FINSOF can offer 
advice and assistance.   
Sweden responds immediately and announces that it will support 
Estonia and NATO with all possible means. Units of U.S. Air Force and 
Marines that have earlier been at Norway’s bases in Bodö and Tromssa 
begin arriving in Såtenäs and Ronneby in Sweden. Russia makes a 
statement that this is a provocation and claims a right to pre-emptive 
strikes against Sweden if the allied troops do not leave Swedish 
territory. Russian forces are also regrouping elsewhere. They advance 
closer to the Finnish border on the Karelian peninsula and near the 
Arctic Circle, from the Alakurtti and Pechanga military bases.197 
Assuming that readiness to act in Finland is already ongoing and the FDF have the 
power to make preparations, the FINSOF has already focused on operational planning and 
readiness actions to reflect that. Nevertheless, in this case, Russia’s movements nearby 
Finland’s borders do not mean a crisis itself. In this scenario, a large-scale multinational 
crisis has become a real possibility, and the FDF must now focus on the national defense, 
using elements from international help if necessary.  
An anonymous high-level source leaks that Sweden is negotiating 
directly with the U.S. about its status were started when Finland had 
repeatedly rejected Swedish requests for enacting components of joint 
defence plans. According to the source, Finland forsook the joint 
defence fearing to endanger its special relationship with Russia. The 
Finnish government calls all ministers and high-level officials to return 
to Finland. The prime minister announces that the Foreign and Security 
Policy Committee will meet immediately to discuss the situation in 
Estonia. In the meeting, the President relays a message he has received: 
Russia says that should Finland become involved in the situation with 
Estonia, this would force Russia to take direct countermeasures. 
Involvement includes military cooperation with third-party countries. 
Finally, the committee decision is formulated in a way that it will be 
                                                 




unanimous. Preparations for the expected responses to the decision are 
begun immediately.198 
2. Russian Hybrid Warfare in Scenario 3 
The multinational scenario leads to a larger crisis where Finland will be involved 
somehow, whether it wants to be or not. Becoming involved would be tricky for Finland; 
making the decision to become involved would be equally tricky for Finland’s decision 
makers. Still, Russia used the same kind of actions during the Ukraine situation in 2014, 
and these events led to the occupation of eastern Ukraine.199 The Russian actions described 
in this scenario are depicted using Gerasimov model in Figure 17.  
The scenario starts from the Escalation phase with the “accidental” shooting in 
Estonia and ends at the very beginning of the Crisis phase, with an immediate military 
threat caused by Russian strategic deployments. This scenario highlights the Russian threat 
of the Arctic areas, which needs consideration in further studies. 
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Figure 17.  Russian actions in Scenario 3: Finland’s multilateral 
option.200 
3. Implications to FINSOF 
In this third scenario, from the first indicators that something is happening time 
moves quickly. Finland needs to have systems in place and troops ready to handle a 
situation that evolves quickly. The early and low-level presence of NATO and U.S. SOF201 
in Estonia may help the FINSOF create a good cooperation-based network to keep track of 
what is going on in the region. It is also important for Finland to become a part of the global 
                                                 
200 Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.” Additional information added 
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SOF network (that is, the Global Special Operations Consortium, or GSOC).202 Such 
connections would allow the FINSOF and the Finnish government to show support for 
Western allies, show their willingness to defend their own soil against adversary, gain 
operative experience for FINSOF, and create a cooperation and intelligence network 
through NATO SOF structures.  
FINSOF’s viability in this scenario can be divided in two parts. The first part 
concerns the actions at home and in preparation for the upcoming crisis. The second part 
consists of the actions helping Estonians with advice and assistance. Both these actions can 
support each other in the scenario. The coordination between the two operational lines can 
perhaps be handled via NATO SOF structures or in the maritime through the BMCC. The 
viability level for scenario 3 is shown in Table 6. 
                                                 
202 Walter L. Christman, Enhancing the Global SOF Enterprise: A Consortium Concept (Tampa, FL: 
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International connections and relations through networks and meetings can keep 
FINSOF aware of what is going on. Situational awareness in this case helps Finnish troops 
re-form and prepare for mobilization. In this case the indicators were clear, at least in that 
phase when Russian troops entered the city Narva. FINSOF operational success is 
enhanced by having pre-established relationships with international counterparts in the 
right places abroad and at home. Also, relationships with the intelligence community are 
needed. Communications and connections mean having that FINSOF liaison teams be 
prepared to go to the NATO Special Operations Component Command (SOCC), for 
example, to coordinate with tasks that are tailored to the needs of the Estonian government. 
The help to Estonians is depicted in Figure 18, marked in light blue, and that help 
will continue until the Crisis phase is complete or there is a radical change in the situation. 
This scenario requires the FINSOF Task Force is called back home from the Middle East.  
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Figure 18.  Basic layer to scenario build-up process on the NATO 
Spectrum of Conflict. Emphasis added from Scenario 3.203 
Events in Estonia are reflected immediately in the overall security situation in the 
Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe. In Finland the intelligence structures need to focus 
on indicators inside Finland that could lead to the same kind of situation that happened in 
Estonia in this scenario. From FINSOF’s perspective, the SOF from the Finnish Police and 
from the Finnish Border Guard units need to prepare to conduct counterterrorism 
operations; meanwhile, the FDF SOF need to prepare both to support the counterterrorism 
operation and to carry out operations behind enemy lines with the full spectrum of SOF 
tasks. The tricky part in this scenario is that the main goal was left unrevealed. Russia is 
not a sitting target here; its intentions may not be what were expected. Moreover, it has the 
ability to adapt its tactics if necessary.204  
Analysis about FINSOF is provided in Table 7. 
                                                 
203 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–3. 
204 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2008), 9. 
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Table 7.   SWOT with FINSOF in scenario 3: Finland’s multilateral option. 
 
 
The aftermath from scenario 3 gives the idea that FINSOF can be used in this kind 
of large multinational crisis traditionally with the full spectrum of SOF tasks. The Finnish 
government response in case of a multinational crisis also creates the psychological effect 
back home that Finland does not face this crisis alone. Furthermore, from the SOF 
perspective, there is the possibility of getting help from outside, either in the form of 
equipment and capabilities or even troops to do specific missions. In this case, one example 
would be an outside country providing close air support capabilities or providing air 
support to deliver FINSOF back home from abroad.   
Demonstrating FINSOF’s readiness can send a political message to Russia that 
Finland is ready if something happens. At the same time, FINSOF can control the 
possibility of escalation with preventive actions, and can, at a low cost, distract and disrupt 
any networks the enemy might establish in Finland.  
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D. ANALYSIS 
In every scenario Russia used the same model to achieve its political goals. Using 
the same model Russia makes its actions predictable. Every case starts from the defender’s 
side during the gray-zone period when the aggressor, Russia, uses different methods to 
disguise its true intentions and uses deception to cover its actions. Russia also uses political 
pressure and direct threats to affect the defender’s readiness and mobilization systems. 
Military action starts with surprise from available troops from their home base or from 
exercises near target areas. The goal of all these actions is to achieve the element of surprise 
and mislead the defender into being unprepared when the Escalation phase of Gerasimov 
model starts. 
Russia was able to find vulnerabilities within its targets. Scenarios showed that 
Russia has information from each nation’s internal security situations, vital functions, 
defense capabilities, and international cooperation. Finding vulnerabilities from these 
areas, it was able to create an offensive hybrid operation by using Gerasimov model to 
implement operations execution. 
All three scenarios showed that the FINSOF are the strategic level force suitable to 
use from the very beginning of the pre-crisis situation and during the gray-zone period. The 
overall viability of using FINSOF was high (over 0) in each of the scenarios, but each 
scenario used different variables. Lack of certain capabilities reduced the maximum values, 
but still those values remained (see Table 8). The values also show that SOF alone cannot 
do these operations. FINSOF needs support and cooperation from other authorities, armed 
services, and from civil society, as well as from other capabilities, such as psychological 





Table 8.   FINSOF’s Viability in each scenario. 
Item Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 














Even though the FINSOF peacetime force is not big, it is still an effective and low-
cost tool to use in difficult situations in the homeland and abroad. The main takeaways 
from strengths, opportunities, weaknesses, and threats from the three scenarios’ SWOT 
tables can be summarized as follows: 
Strengths 
- The changing post-Cold War security situation in Northern Europe has required 
ongoing upkeep to the operational planning in FDF, which has given the 
FINSOF basic tasks in MA, DA, and SR; tactical level structures and principles 
allow FINSOF to defend the homeland. 
- Operations and exercises abroad have given the FINSOF operational 
experience to face difficult situations in different operational environments; 
operations have also developed FINSOF interoperability with other allied 
forces. 
- The flexibility to use forces from different ministries together has strengthened 
Finland’s ability to better confront hybrid threats.  
Opportunities 
- International cooperation can help FINSOF get capabilities from abroad if 
needed, and to provide help to other countries using FINSOF capabilities, if 
necessary. 
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- Continuation of operational planning gives several possibilities to 
repositioning FINSOF because the home bases in the southern part of Finland 
are inside the perimeter of the Russia’s precision-guided capabilities. 
- Finland’s bilateral agreements with Sweden and the United States allow 
FINSOF to carry out operational planning, execution, and cooperation against 
hybrid threats in crisis situations. 
- Intelligence cooperation with Sweden gives Finland a better picture of the 
Baltic Sea area to help decision makers analyze better upcoming situations. 
Weaknesses 
- Lack of Finnish special operations fixed-wing aviation organizational 
structures and strategic airlift capability weakens FINSOF capabilities. 
- The overall quantity of FINSOF operators is not high, which reduces the 
Finland’s ability to use them against hybrid threats in several at the same time. 
- There are very few official connections between FINSOF and Finnish Military 
Deception planning, which decreases the possibility of using FINSOF in covert 
or clandestine operations. 
Threats 
- The speed of the nascent crisis can surprise decision makers so the vital 
functions of preventive actions may be delayed. 
- A crisis anywhere in the Baltic Sea area can drag Finland into the same crisis. 
- Using FINSOF in several locations abroad at the same time leaves gaps in 
homeland security. 
In Table 9, a summary of the main takeaways from each scenario is provided using 
the SWOT technique to compare: 1) Strengths to Opportunities to find Advantages, 2) 
Strengths to Threats to find Strategies, 3) Weaknesses to Opportunities to find 
Competencies, and 4) Weaknesses to Threats to find Risks.   
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After all three scenarios, we can conclude that FINSOF started its response actions 
by supporting somebody else as part of the comprehensive response against a threat. 
Support to other nations’ authorities, local people, or another local authority seems to be 
the trend to counter hybrid threats. FINSOF alone cannot fight against various hybrid 
threats, but it can offer useful tools in difficult situations where readiness, specialized skills, 
and strike capability are needed. A combination of the FINSOF element and supportive 
capabilities, such as information operations, can be called hybrid actions against hybrid 
threats. In most of these cases, there is a need to establish some sort of liaison element with 
the right personalities and competencies to decide which information should be distributed 
and what actions must be taken.    
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The lack of a FINSOF doctrine may mean that decision makers do not have enough 
information about when and how, or even whether, to use FINSOF. This lack of doctrine 
can lead to a situation in which valuable capability is useless when it is most needed. 
Use of FINSOF capability against hybrid threats needs first of all situational 
awareness, risk assessment, and readiness. Preparedness of FINSOF creates resilience and 
needs training, exercises, interoperability, equipment, and a mobilization system. 
Capability use also requires processes of planning and tasking, but also the training of 
decision makers in how to use FINSOF in proper and effective ways. 
Another meaningful finding is that Finland will be dragged into a crisis that 
escalates somewhere in the Baltic Sea due to the necessity to protect its lines of shipping 
and communication. The Baltic Sea area is crowded and cramped, and new technologies 
and A2/AD capabilities can allow an adversary to control the sea from the land, as from 
Gotland, for example. Moreover, it also means that the Escalation phase of Gerasimov 
model can already be underway while Finland’s decision makers are still in the Pre-crisis 
phase and the origins of the crisis have gone unnoticed for a long (see Figure 19). These 
findings are important for two reasons: 1) they show that the nation’s supplies are 
dependent on these shipping lines in the Baltic Sea and those lines may deteriorate during 
a crisis, and without support from somebody else, Finland cannot survive the crisis alone; 
and 2) Finland’s readiness process needs to be adjusted so that it can react to a crisis more 
rapidly, and at the same time, Finland needs to decide more quickly which laws should be 
activated in times of crisis.  
 92 
 
Figure 19.  FINSOF capability to countering hybrid threats during the 
development of a crisis.205 
In the very beginning of this work, I noted that FINSOF include specialized troops 
from the Finnish Police and Border Guard, whose primary task is counterterrorism. Since 
counterterrorism played a major role in these scenarios, this means that counterterrorism 
must become part of FINSOF’s basic doctrine. During an ongoing crisis period FINSOF 
can do the full spectrum of tasks, but the line is often not clear for when a crisis starts and 
when it will end; the unpredictable development of crises involving hybrid warfare requires 
readiness, flexibility, and available structures of the countering forces, such as FINSOF. 
The full spectrum of special operation tasks is available to use depending on the situation 
and its different phases, the countries involved, and the limited by the Rules of Engagement 
(ROE). In addition to deciding when FINSOF should be used, decision makers also need 
to decide how to handle a crisis when parts of FINSOF are overseas. 
 
                                                 
205 Figure 20 uses Gerasimov model and the NATO Spectrum of Conflict together. NATO, Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–3; and Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear 
War.” 
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V. FUTURE ROLE OF FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Mankind has had ten-thousand years of experience at fighting and if we 
must fight, we have no excuse for not fighting well. 
—T. E. Lawrence206 
 
A. DISCUSSION 
FINSOF are a cost-effective tool for achieving strategic goals. This means 
flexibility to use force and capabilities in demanding special operations in demanding 
situations and environments all over the world. Development of FINSOF started several 
decades ago, and now it is time to take the next step towards the new decade. 
This work addressed two main topics: the changing of Finland’s security 
environment and the development of Finnish special operations. The operating 
environment has changed since the end of the Cold War. Hybrid warfare is here to exploit 
all dimensions in the battlefield. It allows adversaries to use both conventional and non-
conventional methods to achieve their goals. Some examples of hybrid warfare include the 
use of non-military or military armed groups during peacetime without a declaration of 
war; the use of short-time precision strike capabilities against important military and 
civilian infrastructure and capabilities; the use of indirect and asymmetric methods; and 
the use of information warfare techniques to deceive and mislead the opposition about the 
true purpose of an operation.  
To address hybrid threats and security issues, FINSOF need an apparatus and 
strategy that are accepted as part of Finland’s political goals. According to Leo Blanken, 
“strategy works like a bridge between political goals and the military machine’s operational 
benchmarks.”207 FINSOF has the information to build an apparatus and it has incentives to 
                                                 
206 T. E. Lawrence, AZQuotes, Wind and Fly LTD, accessed October 10, 2018, 
https://www.azquotes.com/quote/407985. 
207 Leo Blanken, “Assessing War” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 1, 
2018). 
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create this machine. Lack of the special operations doctrine puts the units in a situation 
where those units are doing the “dirty work,” but their relationship to the bigger picture 
and other units requires doctrine to shape that work and interoperability at a higher level. 
Because FINSOF has a small number of troops, their training and focus areas need to be 
evaluated and studied in the future.  
FINSOF is perfectly suited to cooperate with and support other actors and allies, 
including in the planning and execution of missions in the operating environment. For 
example, FINSOF can operate in a regional context around Finland and the Baltic Sea area, 
but it has the ability to carry out operations abroad if needed. An environment that is too 
complex, dangerous, or inaccessible to be handled by other forces can be handled by 
FINSOF. Using a small number of professional operators for a mission creates less political 
risk for a leader than does sending a large formation of conventional troops with reservists 
or conscripts.   
Furthermore, the Finnish defence policy should maintain the security situation as it 
is in the Baltic Sea area and Scandinavia. It can rely on a working process among its 
security apparatus, its working defense structures, and its international relations. Finland 
needs those mechanisms because its supply security depends on outside help if a crisis in 
the Baltic Sea area starts to take time. In that light, the Finnish Government Defense Report 
2017 guides defense policy as follows: 
• The National defense capability maintained and developed against 
threats and complex nature of conflicts. 
• Defense readiness will be improved. 
• International defense cooperation will continue deepen, highlighting 
cooperation with the United States and Sweden. 
• Conscript and reservist training system will stay as a cost-effective 
way to maintain credible defense forces.208 
                                                 
208 The Finnish Government Program, Government’s Defence Report, 5–6. 
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According the same report, “The capability of the Special Forces to carry out 
reconnaissance and raids will be retained. Mid-life updates on the helicopter fleet will 
guarantee the mobility and reaction capability of Special Forces and readiness units, and 
the provision of support to the services’ other forces.”209 This means that the Finnish 
Government sees FINSOF as an important part of the national defense structure and 
readiness forces. FINSOF needs to build its capability to handle future threats, and that 
requires strategy and doctrine.  
B. SUMMARY 
This capstone project finds that FINSOF can achieve the flexibility it needs to 
conduct internal and external missions in a variety of security situations. In order to 
accomplish this, FINSOF must develop more integration and interoperability with units 
from Ministry of Interior but also with units from other parts of the military, government 
agencies, and units from partner nations. FINSOF must also acquire the structures, 
equipment, and capabilities that will allow them to support these operations in the 
homeland and abroad. FINSOF’s ability to conduct missions abroad is aided by several 
international agreements and Finland’s international cooperation. Finland’s comprehensive 
approach to defense, newly edited laws, and an understanding of FINSOF’s role will enable 
them to better perform their tasks.  
Integrating specialized troops to counter hybrid threats requires renewing or 
reviewing FINSOF’s core tasks. This study views the FINSOF’s role as part of Finland’s 
strategic level first response to threats. FINSOF can provide kinetic means to decision 
makers while strike effects can also be non-kinetic effects as psychological effects of both 
friends and enemies. Hybrid threats and actors affect both the crisis itself and the gray-zone 
time before the crisis, and these actions are multidimensional. While FINSOF cannot work 
full-time in all-dimensions of warfighting, it can be a useful tool in most of the cases.    
                                                 
209 The Finnish Government Program, Government’s Defence Report (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2017), 25. 
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FINSOF provide decision makers with a tool, but the time when the decision is 
made to use SOF is the key (Means) that leads to action (see Figure 20). Using SOF upfront 
is better than not using it at all. This idea fits well with the new definition of FINSOF in 
which Police and Border Guard SOF units’ basic operating principles are based on response 
speed.  Furthermore, the desired end state (Ends) of operation and behavior of the adversary 
impose requirements, assessments, risks, and opportunities on the decision to use SOF. 
Understanding the adversary and hybrid warfare as well as finding certain indicators will 
help Finland’s leaders to make the right decisions in a timely manner, and to direct the 
planning, intelligence, situational awareness, and command and control processes (Ways) 
in the right direction. At the strategic level, the choice of whether or not to use SOF is part 
of the decision makers’ information campaign. Using SOF may trigger the beginning of 
other operations, such as psychological operations, or SOF can be a part of those 
operations.  
 




Developing technologies have changed the way we fight. This study examined the 
strategies, advantages, competencies, and risks that might occur if FINSOF were to renew 
its structures and tasks in order to better repel hybrid threats more effectively and 
efficiently. A Proper strategy needs to be a part of the process as Finnish special operations 
build their capability toward a “known” unknown future. There will always be unknown 
indicators that can affect the desired end state in the future, but at some point we must start 
this process. Hybrid warfare uses a wide range of capabilities in its operations, and the 
lessons learned from recent situations must be analyzed and taken into consideration for 
capability building. Capability building needs long-time planning of the costs and human 
resources required to provide highly trained and capable personnel to face demanding 
circumstances on the battlefield and in equivocal situations.  
1. FINSOF Doctrine 
As discussed earlier, addressing the lack of FINSOF doctrine is the key to efficient 
and proper use of force. Doctrine should lead to FINSOF doing optimal tasks and should 
define the factors needed for successful special operations. This study found some of the 
factors, which need to be described in the doctrine: 
• Clear strategy and objective of FINSOF 
• Command, Control, and Communications structures to support FINSOF 
• Operational planning procedures for effective task execution 
• Organization and structure of FINSOF, including reserves and training 
paths 
• Interoperability and cooperation with international and domestic partners 
2. Strategy and Capability 
This study finds that the strategy of FINSOF need to renew by creating a suitable 
doctrine. The proper strategy needs also long-term goal which gives the roots of the 
development planning and operational benchmarks (see Figure 21). This goal can be 
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achievable within the context of the right vision which helps to find right path to the 
mission. The Finnish special operations mission is the basis for FINSOF support to Finnish 
defence wherever needed. The FINSOF mission statement defines the forces’ mission and 
reflects the evolution of FINSOF with information and incentives. Because the mission 
statement needs more study and large acceptance from the FINSOF, I do not try to write 
the mission statement in this study. 
Finnish special operations vision pictures the successful FINSOF organization in 
the future. Finnish special operations core values are the ethical guidelines that define the 
code of conduct for operations in the future, which helps to find operational benchmarks 
after the job is done. Special operations align with FINSOF’s culture and vision to define 
SOF identity. Conclusion of this study: FINSOF’s vision is to become Finland’s most 
respected branch of service. It will do so by serving as an interoperability strategic-level 
tool for countering hybrid threats in cooperation with other authorities, military units, and 
international allies. 
 
Figure 21.  FINSOF’s idea of creating mission and vision. 
FINSOF needs the trust of decision makers and international communities. Trust 
can be achieved through information sharing and teaching others what FINSOF are, and 
showing them how FINSOF have conducted operations abroad and in the homeland. Far 
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too few people know FINSOF’s history. But, like every other military unit, FINSOF’s roots 
lie in their history, and that history must remain part of FINSOF even as they develop and 
evolve. History defines FINSOF’s core values, which lead to the vision of what FINSOF 
will be in the future. In this study, I have recognized a few of the core values of FINSOF 
as follows:      
• “No one left behind” attitude: FINSOF members do better together. No 
one person can do his or her job without the support of the SOF family. 
Together as a team, FINSOF members are strong. 
• Commitment: FINSOF recognized and valued any given task and purpose 
for the Finnish Defence. FINSOF owns a collective responsibility to serve 
as efficiently as possible toward the final goal. 
• Flexibility: FINSOF’s structure and mindset stays flexible to cope with 
any situation to achieve operational excellence. 
• Readiness: FINSOF maintain high readiness and capabilities to respond to 
tasks and threats. 
• Partnership: FINSOF build strong relationships with their valued partners 
in the homeland and abroad. 
An organization that is building its capability requires certain essential elements in 
order to become an effective tool in the future. In Finland, capability building uses NATO’s 
method known as DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, 
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Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability).210 However, in order to be able to develop its 
new capabilities, FINSOF needs to incorporate different perspectives.  
Limitations on this study prevented a deeper dive into such areas as psychological 
operations, military deception, and the human factor in special operations. These 
limitations create avenues for further research and questions. How will FINSOF train 
capable, technically adept, and internationally interoperable special operator at all levels? 
Are there ways to build a common special operators’ basic training systems or specialized 
tactical modules depending on specific subjects? (See Appendix H, FINSOF Training 
Categories.) It is clear that every FINSOF unit needs to know and do overlapping tasks in 
the future. This will require an increased level of knowledge and training.     
3. Use of Capability 
Building a capability is not enough. The capability must be tested in order to prove 
its strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities in operations at home, abroad, and in some 
combination of the two. Furthermore, FINSOF also needs a plan to recall troops back home 
if the security situation requires it. But FINSOF do need to serve abroad when called upon 
to do so. There are strategic reasons for this. First, doing so would show possible 
adversaries that FINSOF can conduct effective operations. Second, it would show Finland's 
allies that Finland will be a part of the Western community, which could open politically 
important strategic doors. (See Appendix I, National Cooperation of FINSOF.)  
Furthermore, capability building requires interoperability among FINSOF, 
conventional forces, and interagency ministries, as well as international allies. 
Interoperability provides the equipment, communication, methods, and ways to conduct 
operations together with allied forces. To be interoperable requires regular exercise 
                                                 
210 Jacqueline Eaton, John Redmayne, and Marvin Thordsen, Joint Analysis Handbook (Lisbon, 
Portugal: NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, 2016), 44–46, 
http://www.jallc.nato.int/products/docs/Joint_Analysis_Handbook_4th_edition.pdf. Through the 
DOTLMPFI process FINSOF can ask important questions to develop its doctrine. As mentioned in the 
handbook, for example: “Does new doctrine need to be developed which would provide a solution to the 
issue?, Where are the organizational problems occurring?, Are there issues caused by lack of competency 
on existing systems or training?, Can increases in performance be achieved without development of a new 
system? Do the issues affect a headquarters’ ability to conduct operations? Are the used technology and 
processes interoperable?” 
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activities and information sharing programs, especially with developed liaison teams. In 
FINSOF, this has been a good way to develop the troops, and maintain abilities to conduct 
operations abroad and in the homeland. These aforementioned interoperability issues need 
more study, such as how FINSOF can better integrated themselves into psychological 
warfare or how FINSOF can work together with cyber forces. 
 The use of FINSOF requires suitable personnel and care for their welfare. This 
means career management and development. Experienced personnel with education needs 
career paths from operators to officers. To be able to create these paths, FINSOF requires 
branch suitable to handle personnel, training and education issues.   
4. Developing the Structures of FINSOF 
In order to remain a relevant tool for national leaders, Special Operators must 
develop their critical thinking and improve their critical skills by adapting to new kinds of 
technology and learning how hybrid threats behave. FINSOF as a tool can be reorganized 
and structured better to respond to hybrid warfare to support Finland’s comprehensive 
approach to defense. They need a solid command structure at the right level to plan and 
execute operations; we can call this structure a strategic apex. The operating core can be 
tailored as needed with supporting staff and technologies, as Figure 22 shows. This 
structure can be called the FINSOF Combined Joint Task Force. 
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Figure 22.  FINSOF Combined Joint Task Force. Adapted from Joint 
Publication 3–05 and reformulated by the author.211 
This Combined Joint Task Force structure at the tactical and operational levels 
needs a Combined Joint Staff to organize at the upper level. Sometimes this staff will be 
structured as a part of the military organization, and sometimes as a part of the national 
organization. In either case, solid structure, even a small one, is needed at the right level 
with the authority to approve operations and cooperation with others if needed. This 
structure type gives the decision makers a suitable tool box for a variety of situations. There 
needs to be further study concerning what new technologies and capabilities should adapt 
to these structures; for example, what will be the role of female operators in FINSOF? 
                                                 
211 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations 3–05, III-5. 
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5. Developing the FINSOF Tasks 
The FINSOF tasks mentioned several times during this study need to be developed. 
During the study the counterterrorism task was raised among the SOF core tasks. Other 
support tasks can be also added to the FINSOF “task pie.” This study has already 
recognized the need for SOF Air and Maritime tasks.  Some type of Joint support-specific 
task set is also required, which would allow FINSOF to, for example, support the Joint 
fires tasks or be part of the task of countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) as 
part of the national defence or part of the multinational tasks (see Figure 23). Because 
technological developments demand more and more specific skills from special operations, 
the specific details of these tasks will require further study. To be a part of the Finnish 
doctrine, these tasks must be well organized to support FDF tasks, the FINSOF, and 
international partners. Examples of such tasks are presented in Appendix J, Future FINSOF 
Tasks.  
 




To summarize this study, it does not take a lot of effort to determine that the key to 
FINSOF’s success is the ability to renew itself, which needs flexibility and adaptability. 
Changing security threats, new tactics, and new technologies keep the development process 




APPENDIX A.  DEFINITIONS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASKS 
IN NATO 
Definition of Special Operations Tasks in NATO AJP 3.5 
Direct Action (DA) 
DA is a precise offensive operation conducted by SOF which is limited in scope and duration in order to 
seize, destroy, disrupt, capture, exploit, recover, or damage high value or high pay-off targets. DA differs 
from conventional offensive actions in the level of risk, techniques employed, and the degree of precision 
utilized to create a specific effect, and usually incorporates a planned withdrawal from the immediate 
objective area. DA is focused on specific, well-defined targets of strategic and operational significance, or 
in the conduct of decisive tactical operations. SOF may conduct DA independently, with support from 
conventional forces, or in support of conventional forces. 
 
Special Reconnaissance (SR) 
SR is conducted by SOF to support the collection of a commander’s Priority Intelligence Requirements 
(PIRs) by employing unique capabilities or Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) 
assets. As part of the Allied theatre INTEL collection process, SR provides specific, well-defined, and 
possibly time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. It may complement other 
collection methods where constraints are imposed by weather, terrain-masking, hostile countermeasures, 
or other systems’ availability. SR places persistent “eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
territory. SOF can provide timely information by using their judgment and initiative in a way that technical 
JISR cannot. SOF may conduct these tasks separately, supported by, in conjunction with, or in support of 
other component commands. They may use advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques, JISR 
assets and equipment, and collection methods, sometimes augmented by the employment of indigenous 
assets. 
 
Military Assistance (MA) 
MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through 
organizing training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations. The range of MA includes, 
but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional, and 
national leadership or organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. SOF 
conduct MA within their field of expertise. 
 
SOF Activities within Allied Joint Operations: 
 
Counter Insurgency (COIN) 
SOF can effectively complement the overarching application of diplomatic, economic, military, and 
information Alliances’ instruments of power, applied in a COIN role. When preparing for COIN, SOF can 
provide area assessments and an early command, control, and communications capability. During COIN, 
SOF could conduct MA, SR, DA, or a suitable combination of these principal tasks, to support Allied Joint 
operations in order to accomplish the defined political and strategic objectives. The success of these 
operations can be enhanced by the conduct of technical exploitation operations (TEO). 
 
Counter Terrorism (CT) 
CT is an overarching umbrella of offensive measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of Allied 
interests, their forces, individuals, and property to terrorism, to include counter-force activities and 
containment by military force and civil agencies. SOF should be utilized when there is high risk, a need for 
special capabilities, or a requirement to conduct covert or clandestine operations. These forces can operate 
in concert with other Joint force efforts or operate independently by conducting DA (while minimizing 
collateral damage), SR, or MA. The success of these operations can be enhanced by the conduct of TEO. 
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Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as well as Chemical, Biological, 
and Nuclear (CBRN) Materials 
SOF are a significant part of Allied capabilities to support NATO’s counter proliferation and trafficking 
objectives related to WMD and CBRN related materials, including the ability to conduct, with other 
specialized elements, WMD disablement missions. WMD disablement is generally described as operations 
whose aim is to systematically locate, secure, characterize, eliminate, or dispose WMD, CBRN weapons, 
CBRN devices and CBRN materials, and/or a potential adversary's capability to research, develop, test, 
produce, stockpile, deploy, or employ such weapons, devices, and materials. Activities designed to conduct 
WMD disablement missions are inherently complex and generally necessitate the employment of specially 
trained and equipped personnel. In the context of a NATO operation, NATO SOF involvement in the WMD 
disablement missions will generally be deferred to the members of the Alliance possessing these specialized 
capabilities. In extremis, however, where specialized forces cannot be brought in sufficient time to prevent 
the employment of WMD and/or CBRN materials, or their immediate interdiction is required, the authority 
to utilize other NATO forces, to include NATO SOF, to capture, deter, secure, or assist in WMD 
disablement mission, might be sought. 
 
Hostage Release Operation (HRO) 
NATO SOF may be involved in an HRO, under certain circumstances 
 
Faction Liaison 
In order to gain a better understanding of the operating environment, situational awareness, and to collect 
information, SOF can liaise with many factions in a Joint Operational Area (JOA). The information 
available at the different host actors is often vital in support of full spectrum special operations. The 
assignment of capable liaison officers can be especially relevant in supporting MA tasks. They are 
important for INTEL partnering/mentoring which should improve the information collection in remote 
areas in using indigenous elements. The information has to be integrated in the INTEL process/cycle in 
order to develop joint INTEL preparation of the battle space, disseminate assessments and reports, and 
support the operations planning process. 
 
SOF Air Missions (SOA) 
SOF air operations conduct and support each of the principal tasks assigned to NATO SOF. The primary 
mission of special operations air forces is enhanced air mobility—specialized air transport activities via 
fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or tilt-rotor aircraft. Other special air warfare activities may include air to land 
integration (ALI), close air support (CAS), close combat attack (CCA), air-to-air refueling (AAR), 
personnel recovery (PR), and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for special operations air, land, and 
maritime forces.  
 
SOF Maritime Operations (SOM) 
Maritime SOF tasks include any of the principal SOF tasks, provided that the SOF units conducting those 
tasks are similarly organized as ground SOF units. Maritime SOF primarily conduct operations in the 
coastal, riverine, and maritime environments. They utilize small, flexible, mobile units operating under, 
on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise application of 
force. They may be focused on, but not restricted to, the following activities: a) Insertion/extraction by 
sea, b) Discreet beach reconnaissance (hydrographic survey) in advance of an amphibious operation, c) 
Discreet assault route preparation in advance of an amphibious operation, d) Recovery or protection of 
ships and maritime oil installations, e) Coastal reconnaissance, f) Other activities performed in support of 
an amphibious operation
 
or any other maritime operation. 212 
                                                 
212 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 2–1 – 2–7. 
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APPENDIX B.  DEFINITIONS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN 
NATO AND THE UNITED STATES 
Definition of Special Operations 
NATO AJP 3.5 U.S. Joint Publication 3–05 
Special operations are military 
activities conducted by specially 
designated, organized, trained, and 
equipped forces, manned with selected 
personnel, using unconventional tactics, 
techniques, and modes of employment. 
These activities may be conducted across 
the full range of military operations, 
independently or with conventional forces, 
to help achieve the desired end-state. 
Politico-military considerations may 
require clandestine or covert techniques 
and the acceptance of a degree of political 
or military risk not associated with 
operations by conventional forces. Special 
Operations deliver strategic or operational-
level results or are executed where 
significant political risk exists.213 
Special operations require unique 
modes of employment, tactics, techniques, 
procedures, and equipment. They are often 
conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 
and/or  diplomatically sensitive 
environments, and are characterized by one 
or more of the following: time-sensitivity, 
clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, 
work with or through indigenous forces, 
greater requirements for regional 
orientation and cultural expertise, and a 
higher degree of risk. Special operations 
provide joint force commanders (JFCs) 
and chiefs of the mission with discrete, 
precise, and scalable options that can be 
synchronized with activities of other 
interagency partners to achieve United 
States Government (USG) objectives.214 
 
                                                 
213 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–1. 
214 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Special Operations, Ix. 
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APPENDIX C.  THE HISTORICAL TIMELINE OF FINSOF 
 
Figure 24.  Finnish Special Operations Forces with main trainings since 1915.215 
                                                 
215 In Figure 24, different colors represent the main elements of the forces: Green=Land and Army SOF, Dark Blue=Marine and Naval SOF, 
Orange/Green=Border Guard SOF, Light Blue=Air capable SOF, Medium/Sapphire Blue= Police SOF. 
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APPENDIX D.  FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES’ TASKS AND 
READINESS STRUCTURE 
The main purpose of the Finnish national defence is to guarantee Finland’s 
independence and defend its sovereignty, secure its people, and maintain Finland’s ability 
to survive crises. Overall defence in Finland has related to the population’s will to defend 
their own country, general conscript service, and international cooperation. According to 
this thinking, the FDF got quite broad main tasks. These primary duties are: 1) the military 
defence of Finland; 2) supporting other authorities; 3) providing and receiving international 
assistance; and 4) taking part in international military crisis management.216 The main 
purpose of the defence is to guarantee Finland’s independence and defend its sovereignty, 
secure its people, and maintain Finland’s ability to survive crises.  
 
Figure 25.  The FDF’s main structure, according to the Finnish 
Government Defence Report 2017.217  
                                                 
216 Act on the Defence Forces 551, §1 (May 11, 2007), renewed June 28, 2017, by 427/2017, 
https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2007/20070551?search%5Btype%5D=pika&search%5Bpika%5D=lak
i%20puolustusvoimista.  
217 The Finnish Government Program, Government’s Defense Report (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2017), 20, https://www.defmin.fi/en/publications/the_governments_defence_report_2017, 
Additional information added by the author. 
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At the top of the Figure 25 can be seen the most effective and modern systems 
equipped forces in Finland, which can be used to prevent the escalation of a situation 
against Finland. These are the Readiness formations and units and Rapid Reaction Units 
(RRU). FINSOF is part of these units and formations, and FINSOF can also increase 
manpower with reservists from Readiness forces. The main body of the Finnish military 
units is based on build-up forces, which need mobilization activities before operational use. 
Troops can be divided into maneuver, regional, and local troops, which together increase 
Finland’s wartime strength to 280 000 troops.218  
  
                                                 
218 The Finnish Government Program, Government’s Defence Report, 19–21. 
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Figure 26.  Organization of FINSOF. 
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APPENDIX F.  MAP OF EUROPE WITH NATO AND 
EU BOUNDARIES 
 
Figure 27.  Map of Europe with NATO and EU boundaries.219  
                                                 
219 Aleks Buczkowski, Top 30 Maps and Charts that Explain the European Union, GEO 
Awesomeness, 2017, http://geoawesomeness.com/top-30-maps-charts-explain-european-union/. 
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APPENDIX G.  COMPARISONS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL OF 
COASTAL COUNTRIES OF THE BALTIC SEA 





Defence Spending,  
current US$ m 
Defence Spending,  
per capita (current 
US$) 
Defence Spending,  








2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018 
Russia 52,201 44,470 45,600 367 312 321 3.82 3.47 3.10 900,000 2,000,000 554,000 
             
Finland 3,074 3,100 3,191 561 564 578 1.32 1.30 1.27 22,000 216,000 3,000 
Sweden 5,723 5,738 5,962 584 581 599 1.15 1.12 1.10 30,000 0 1,000 
Total 
(FI+SWE) 8,797 8,838 9,153       52,000 216,000 4,000 
NATO countries 
Denmark 3,516 3,514 3,807 630 628 679 1.17 1.15 1.17 16,000 46,000 0 
Estonia 467 498 543 369 396 434 2.07 2.14 2.11 6,000 28,000 0 
Germany 36,589 37,943 41,734 453 470 518 1.08 1.09 1.14 179,000 28,000 1,000 
Latvia 238 407 507 142 207 261 1.05 1.47 1.68 5,000 8,000 0 
Lithuania 471 637 816 163 223 289 1.14 1.49 1.75 18,000 7,000 11,000 
Poland 10,128 9,101 9,837 263 236 256 2.12 1.94 1.93 105,000 0 73,000 
Total 51,409 52,100 57,244       329,000 117,000 85,000 
 
                                                 
220 “Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons and Defense Data,” The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018): 499–508, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416987. 
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APPENDIX H.  FINSOF TRAINING CATEGORIES  
Table 11.   Examples of FINSOF training categories. 
Unit Priority 
task 

































































































4 = Master level 
3 = Knowhow level 
2 = Knows the basic 
1 = Know how to do it, but needs practice 











APPENDIX I.  NATIONAL COOPERATION OF FINSOF 
 
Figure 28.  National cooperation of FINSOF.221  
 
                                                 
221 Klaus Luotola, “National Co-Operation of FINSOF,” Helsinki, 2015, unpublished slides of 
FINSOF, author’s notes. 
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APPENDIX J. EXAMPLES OF FUTURE FINSOF TASKS 
Definition of Special Operations Tasks from NATO AJP 3.5, converted to serve FINSOF222   
Offensive Actions (OA) 
OA can be conducted by FINSOF are limited in scope and duration in order to destroy, seize, exploit, 
recover, damage, or capture and recover high value targets. OA can be focused on specific targets with 
strategic and operational significance, using activities such as raids ambushes, assaults, and precision 
destruction operations. OA can include guerilla-type activities such as sabotage, and can disrupt the enemy 
if necessary. As part of the Joint effects operations, FINSOF can conduct terminal guidance operations 
against precise targets. As part of the maritime operations, FINSOF can conduct opposed boarding 
operations to take control of a maritime vessel, platform, or islet. 
 
Strategic Reconnaissance (SR)  
SR can be conducted by FINSOF using its unique intelligence capabilities to support commander critical 
information requirements (CCIRs). As part of the Intelligence collection process, FINSOF could provide 
well-defined, specific, and timely or time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance with 
advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques with, for example, exploitation operations (TEO). 
FINSOF can conduct SR tasks separately, supported by, or with other troops and these tasks can be a part 
of the Joint operations with activities of environmental reconnaissance, threat and target assessment, and 
post-strike reconnaissance.    
 
Military Assistance (MA) 
MA can be conducted and purposed to support and influence friendly capabilities, forces and capability 
building. The broad MA category can allow FINSOF to train designated individuals and units in tactical 
employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills with tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. MA can include advising, mentoring, and guidance to improve the performance of designated 
actors, units and leaders to achieve strategic or operational objectives. 
 
Counter Terrorism (CT) 
CT can be designed to reduce the vulnerability of individuals, interests, forces, and property to terrorism 
and specific hybrid threats, by using special capabilities to conduct covert, overt or clandestine operations. 
CT activities can be designed to eliminate threats and neutralize networks, violent individuals, non-state 
actors, insurgents or members of local extremists groups who threaten or use unlawful violence to instill 
fear among society. Hostage release operations (HRO) can be a part of CT when there is need to rescue 
individuals who have been captured by terrorists, whether at home or abroad. 
 
In addition to these core tasks, FINSOF will also need to prepared to engage in supportive actions with 
partners both at home and abroad: 
 
SOF Activities within Joint Operations: 
 
Joint Support (JS) 
JS tasks will be conducted by FINSOF when there is need for them to support Joint activities, Joint fires, 
conventional capabilities and authorities with specific skills and techniques. These tasks can include 
countering of weapons of mass destruction (CMWD) and Chemical, Biological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
materials as well as liaison tasks in areas where is a high need for understanding the operating environment 
                                                 
222 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 2–1 – 2–7.  Text describing tasks modified by 
the author. 
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and situational awareness in order to develop Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) or support to 
psychological (PSYOPS), information (IO) and cyber operations (CYBER). 
SOF Air Missions (SOA) 
SO Air Tasks (SOA) can be conducted special ways to employ air operations to provide innovative support 
conventional troops as well as other authorities. Activities can include specialized air transport, 
insertion/extraction, airlift, evacuation/recovery, fire support, and reconnaissance missions, with unmanned 
aerial vehicles, fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or tilt-rotor aerial vehicles. 
 
SOF Maritime Operations (SOM) 
SOM would be conducted by FINSOF units capable of operating in coastal, archipelago, riverine, maritime, 
and lake-covered environments by special capabilities. Activities can include insertion/extraction under or 
on the water, reconnaissance activities in coastal areas, hydrographic surveys, and support activities to 








                                                 
223 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 2–1 – 2–7. 
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